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Brief of Respondent
JURISDICTION STATEMENT
Defendant

Snyderville

West

(hereinafter

" Snyderville

West") does not contest Plaintiff's assertion of jurisdiction in
this Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal by Plaintiff/Appellant (hereinafter,
including

where

appropriate

her

predecessor

in

this

case,

"Plaintiff" ) from:
(a)

An interlocutory

Order of the Third

District Court,

Summit County, entered November 15, 1988, setting aside
(1)

An August 28, 1985 default judgment, and

(2)

A

January

17,

1986,

final

Judgment

as

to

Snyderville West; and
(b)

A final Order of the same Court entered July 5, 1989,

dismissing the action as to Snyderville West.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in granting Snyderville West' s

Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, where defendant Snyderville
West was not personally served, where its address was known to
counsel for Plaintiff but no attempt at service was made, and
where the only proof of mailing of summons shows that the summons
was mailed to the wrong address?
- 1 -

2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

dismissing

the

Complaint

against Snyderville West in not giving any grounds for dismissal
beyond making reference to the memoranda?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following Rules, cited in this Brief, are determinative
of the issues on appeal:
Rule 4(b), U. R. C. P.
Rule 4(c), U. R. C. P.
Rule 4(f), U. R. C. P.
Rule 12(b), U. R. C. P.
Rule 52, U. R. C. P.
Rule 60, U. R. C. P.
Rule 60(b) (5), U. R. C. P.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a quiet title action to real property

located

in Summit County, Utah.
JL

ChrgnplQgy Qf Relevant F^pt?
I.

Purchase of the Subject Property by Snyderville West,
1.

from

Investor

"Contract")

Snyderville
Associates

dated

July

West
by

13,

purchased

Uniform

Real

1978.

(R.

the

subject

Estate
0602).

property

Contract
The

(the

Contract

covered two parcels of property, an 8-acre parcel not in issue in
this case, and a 7-acre parcel (the subject property).
2.

(R. 0599)

In accordance with the Contract, title to the 8-

2 -

acre parcel was released and conveyed to Snyderville West at the
time of execution of the Contract, and title thereto is not an
issue herein.

The 7-acre parcel was purchased under the Contract

for a total purchase price of $120,000.00, of which $20,000.00
was paid on execution, and the balance was to be paid in semiannual installments until July 1, 1983 when the entire remaining
balance of principal and interest was to become due and payable.
(R. 0599).
3.
Robert

W.

Robert W. Major, Jr.

Major)

("Major") executed

(a. k. a. R. W. Major, a. k. a.
the

Contract

behalf of the seller Investor Associates.

for

and

on

(R. 0599; R. 0603).

Major is the decedent of the Estate of Major in this case.
4.

Reese

S.

Howell,

of

Title

Insurance

("Howell") witnessed the execution of the Contract.

Agency

(R. 0603; R.

0626).
5.

Major

executed

a Notice of Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract (the "Notice of Contract") in favor of Snyderville West,
the

Buyer,

dated

Investor Associates

July
(R.

14,

1978,

0609; R.

as

agent

0599).

("Chairman") of

Howell

notarized on

July 13, 1978 the signature of Major on the Notice of Contract.
6.

Following execution of the Contract, Snyderville

West took possession of the subject property, paid the property
taxes, and made all payments of principal and interest called for
under the Contract in a substantially timely manner.
7.

Major died March 20, 1980.

1).
- 3 -

(R. 0599).

(R. 0021, paragraph

8.

At

the time

of Major's

death

in

1980,

neither

Investor Associates nor Major owned the subject property.

(R.

0626; R. 0627)
9.

Howell7 s office of Title Insurance Agency

after

execution of the Contract in 1978 acted as a collection agent for
Snyderville

West

and

the

Seller,

Investor

Associates

and

subsequently Joseph L. Krofcheck, until the Contract was paid in
full in mid-1983.

(R. 0627).

10. On or about July 20, 1983, Snyderville West made
the final payment as called for under the Contract.

Snyderville

West made its payment by check #150, payable to Title Insurance
Agency in the amount of $32,210.10.

(R. 0599).

11. Thereafter, Snyderville West obtained and recorded
a Warranty Deed which was acknowledged October 26, 1983, recorded
January
Records.

19,

as

Entry

No.

215912

in

the

Summit

County

(R. 0600; R. 0611; R. 0627).
12.

subject

1984

There

property

is

no

document

which

at

any

of

time

in

record
the

affecting

past

vested

the
or

purported to vest in the decedent in this case, Major, any right,
title or interest in or to the subject property.
13.

(R. 0627).

Snyderville West' s address at all times relevant

to this case (and to the present time) was 1253 East 2100 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, which address was also Snyderville
West's "tax notice address" in 1983.

(R. 0274, R. 0279; R. 0600;

R. 0992; R. 0995; R. 1030; pp. 38-39; R. 1031, pp. 13-14).
14.

Snyderville

West

continued

- 4 -

to pay

the

property

taxes

on the subject property

until

1987, when

(on or about

October 22, 1987) Gaddis was informed for the first time that
Snyderville West was no longer the owner of record as to the
subject property, but that Snyderville West had been divested of
fee title ownership through a court order entered in this case.
(R. 0600).
II.

Plaintiff's

Lawsuit

(see also Section C,

" gpyrge pf

Processings, " infrgt)
15.

The Complaint in this case was filed by Plaintiff

as Personal Representative of the deceased, Major, on April 6,
1983.

(R. 0001).
16.

No

Summons

and

Complaint

were

served on Snyderville West, until March 27, 1989.
17.

ever

personally

(R. 0992).

The Summons which was served upon Gaddis on May

11, 1983 made no reference to service upon Snyderville West.

(R.

0050).
18.

At no time prior to 1987 did Plaintiff ever make

any inquiries with Gaddis nor anyone else at the 1253 East 2100
South

address

of

Snyderville

West

as

to

the

whereabouts

of

Snyderville West. (R. 0600).
III. Plaintiff7 s Knowledge of Snyderville West' s Interest in
the Subject Property and its Address.
19.
received
"1982

Plaintiff

in June,

Title

through

her

1982 a Commitment

Report")

which

counsel

in

this

for Title Insurance

covered

the

subject

case
(the

property

(described as "Parcel No. 6" or "Parcel 6") and which showed as
Exception No. 53 that Snyderville West was the grantor in 1981 of
- 5 -

an easement

across

the subject property,

and which showed as

Exception No. 83 that Snyderville West, by reason of a "Notice of
Uniform Real Estate Contract" dated July 13, 1978 and recorded
July

14, 1978, claimed an interest in the subject property by

reason of an unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract.
pp. 60-68, Exhibit 23 thereto).

(R. 1030,

A copy of relevant pages of the

1982 Title Report is attached hereto as Addendum C.

This is a

true copy of said pages of Exhibit 23 to the Davis deposition
transcript (R. 1030).

The front page (R. 1030) of the deposition

transcript has a notation as follows:
Judge

on

8-2-88 in

S. L. " but

"Exhibits to be given to

Snyderville

West

has

not

been

provided with a copy of the exhibits as part of the trial record.
20.

Plaintiff

was

aware

of

Snyderville

West7 s tax

address, 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 by no
later than October,

1983.

(R. 0644-0652; R.

1030, pp. 39 and

58).
IV.

Plaintiff7 s Attempt to Serve Snyderville West by Mail.
(See also Section C. "Course of Proceedings," infra)
21.

attorneys

The Affidavit of Mailing which was prepared by the

for Plaintiff

for use by the Clerk of the Court in

connection with the mailing of Summons7 to certain Defendants in
connection with Plaintiff's attempt to obtain default judgments
against said Defendants, including Snyderville West, was signed,
subscribed and sworn to by the Clerk of the Court on December 19,
1983,

and was

filed

on December

19,

1983.

(R.

0300).

In

pertinent part, as to Snyderville West, the Affidavit states as
follows:
- 6 -

4. The undersigned [Clerk of the Court] mailed a
true and correct copy of said Summons to each of
the Defendants listed below at their respective
addresses by addressing and dispatching a copy of
said Summons and a copy of said Complaint, postage
prepaid:

e.
Snyderville West, 1253 East
7100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84106 (tax notice address);... (R.
0301).
[emphasis added]
Said Affidavit is the only definite evidence before the Court as
to the address to which the Summons and Complaint were mailed to
Snyderville West.

Said address is in error, in that Snyderville

West7 s true address at all times relevant hereto was 1253 East
2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 (see paragraph 13 above).
22.
personal
mailing

The

service
on

("Davis"),

the

attorney
of

process

Defendants

for

Plaintiff

and

service

in

this

responsible

for

publication

and

by

case,

T.

Richard

Davis

(R. 1030, p. 13), does not specifically remember the

envelope addressed to Snyderville West which was mailed by the
Clerk, as described in paragraph 21 above (R. 1030, p. 54), nor
does Davis have an independent recollection nor does Plaintiff
have other evidence of what address was on the envelope (R. 1030,
pp. 89-90), nor was Davis able to state definitely that such an
envelope was never returned to Plaintiff s attorneys

(R. 1030,

pp. 54-55).
23.
themselves
referred

According to Davis, Plaintiff s attorneys did not

put all of the necessary postage on the envelopes

to

in paragraph

22 above
- 7 -

which

were

mailed

to the

Defendants

(including Snyderville West)

(R.

1030, p.

90), and

Davis cannot state with a certainty that the envelope addressed
to Snyderville West was mailed out with the correct postage (R.
1030, p. 92).
24.

According

to William

Frank Nebeker

("Nebeker"),

Carrier Supervisor for the United States Postal Service in 1983,
since the United States Postal Service does not keep any delivery
records

on

regular

certain

that

the

first-class

envelope

mail,

addressed

Nebeker
to

cannot

Snyderville

say

for

West

as

referred to in paragraph 22 above was returned to the sender,
delivered

to

the

addressee,

or

misdelivered

by

the

carrier

(Affidavit No. 2 of William Frank Nebeker, R. 0714-0715).
25.

Neither Snyderville West nor Gaddis on behalf of

Snyderville West ever received, to the knowledge or recollection
of Gaddis, a copy of the Summons and Complaint in this case by
mail.

(R. 0600; R. 1031 at pp. 44-45; R. 0736-0737).
V.

Settlement Discussions by Others.
26.

Attorney Don R.

Strong

("Strong") represented a

number of Defendants in this case, including inter alia Gaddis
personally, but at no time from the filing of the Complaint in
this case through to the time of execution of his Affidavit in
July,

1988 had he or did he represent Snyderville West.

(R.

0973-0974).
27.

Strong personally participated in the settlement

discussions held between and involving Plaintiff and a number of
the Defendants, which settlement discussions led to execution by
.

- 8 -

himself

on

behalf

Snyderville
dated

West),

October

2,

of

certain

Defendants

of that certain Stipulation
1985, and

filed January

17,

(not

including

for Settlement
1986

(R. 0479;

R. 0973-0974).
28.
Defendants
settlement

Dr. Joseph L. Krofcheck (" Krof check" ), one of the
in

this

case,

discussions

personally

involving

the

participated

attorney

in

the

for Plaintiff,

Strong and others, which settlement discussions led to execution
by himself and certain other parties of that same Stipulation for
Settlement referred to in paragraph 28 above. (R. 0967-0968).
29.
during

said

The

understanding

settlement

property, having been

of both

negotiations

Krofcheck

was

that

sold prior to commencement

and
the

of

Strong
subject

the lawsuit

and thereafter deeded away, was not a part of the settlement
discussions.
C*

(R. 0968-0969; R. 0974-0975).

Course gf Proceedings
1.

On

April

6,

1983,

Steven

W.

Major,

then

Personal

Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., deceased,
filed a complaint (the "Complaint") to quiet title to eleven (11)
parcels

of

real

property

located

in

including inter alia as "Parcel No. 6"

Summit

County,

Utah,

(R. 0016) the property

then owned and held by Snyderville West, which property is the
subject of this appeal (the "subject property").
2.

(R. 0001).

The Summons' filed May 13, 1983 named many defendants,

including Snyderville West and Jim Gaddis, an individual, a. k. a.
James R. Gaddis, ("Gaddis"). (R. 0022, et al. ).
- 9 .

3.

The Summons and Complaint were served May 11, 1983 upon

Gaddis, personally.
4.

(R. 0050).

An Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Order

Permitting Service by Publication was filed on October 17, 1983
(R. 0273).
address"

The Affidavit listed Snyderville West's "last known

as 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106,

which address was further stated to be Snyderville West's "tax
notice address."
5.

(R, 0274).

A Motion for Order Permitting Service of Summons by

Publication

for Snyderville

filed October 17, 1983.

West,

among other defendants, was

(R. 0264).

The Order directed service

of process on the listed defendants, including Snyderville West,
by publication and, as to Snyderville West, by mailing a copy of
the Summons and Complaint to Snyderville West at its "last known
address", which was stated to be 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84106 ("tax notice address").
6.

A Summons, dated December 7, 1983, was issued wherein

certain defendants, including

Snyderville

defendants to be served by publication.
7.

(R. 0279).

West, were

named as

(R. 0283).

A Default Certificate was filed August 12, 1985 stating

that all defendants served by publication had failed to appear
and answer Plaintiff's Complaint.
8.

(R. 0432).

A judgment by default was filed August 29, 1985 and

pursuant to that judgment, all of the named defendants, including
Snyderville

West,

were

interest in the property.

defaulted
(R. 0444).
- 10 -

and

determined

to

have

no

9.

On January 17, 1986, final Judgment against Snyderville

West, among other defendants, was filed.
10.

(R. 0552).

On August 1, 1988, following discovery and submission

of memoranda and affidavits by Snyderville West and Plaintiff,
the

Court

arguments

(the
on

Honorable

Snyderville

Michael

R.

West' s Motion

Murphy,
to

Judge)

set Aside

heard
Default

Judgment and made its Minute Entry (R. 0978).
11.

On

September

8,

1988, the

Court

issued

Entry, which was filed on September 9, 1988.
12.

its

Minute

(R. 0979).

On November 10, 1988, the Court issued its Order, which

was filed November 15, 1988, setting aside the default judgment
as to Snyderville West which was filed on August 29, 1985 (R.
0444) and the final Judgment as to Snyderville West which was
filed on January 17, 1986 (R. 0552).
13.

(R. 0986).

In 1989, Plaintiff's Summons and Complaint were served

on Snyderville West at its address, 1253 East 2100 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84106, as shown by an Affidavit of Service.
0995).

The Affidavit

of Service indicates

(R.

that "Jim Gaddis,

general partner" accepted service.
14.

On May 12, 1989, Snyderville West filed its Motion to

Dismiss on the basis that there has been non-compliance with Rule
4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and for the reason that
the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted against Snyderville West.
15.
Frederick,

(R. 0996).

On June 5, 1989, the Court

(the Honorable J.

Judge) filed its Minute Entry,
- 11 -

Dennis

in which the Court

granted Snyderville West's Motion to Dismiss.
16.

On July 5, 1989, the Court filed its Order dismissing

the Complaint against Snyderville West.
17.

(R. 1020).

On July 31, 1989, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal,

appealing

the

Snyderville
Order

final

West

vacating

Order

entered
and

dismissing

July

setting

5,

the

aside

the

against

Interlocutory

Judgments

against

(R. 1023).

Disposition in the Lower Court
1.

(R.

action

1989, and the

Snyderville West entered November 15, 1988.
D.

(R. 1019).

Pursuant

0979),

to Minute Entry entered

the trial

September

court, the Honorable Michael

R.

9, 1988,
Murphy,

Judge, by Order dated November 15, 1988, (R. 0986), set aside the
default judgment filed against Snyderville West August 29, 1985
(R.

0444) and

the final

Judgment

filed

January

17,

1986

(R.

0552).
2.
Dennis

On July

5,

Frederick,

Snyderville West.

1989, the trial
Judge,

dismissed

court, the Honorable J.
the

Complaint

against

(R, 1020).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This case on appeal comes down to the following issue:
given that Plaintiff had the correct address of Snyderville West,
but failed to attempt personal service of Snyderville West at
that address, and instead attempted service by mail, but used the
incorrect address, is Plaintiff nonetheless entitled to have a
default judgment against Snyderville West?
The

trial

court,

the

Honorable

- 12 -

Michael

R.

Murphy,

Judge, concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to have default
judgment.
given

In his words, " [n]o adequate explanation has been

for what

appears

to be

a

failure

to personally

serve

Snyderville West at its known tax notice address. . ..The mistake
that apparently occurred must be corrected and Rule 60 is the
vehicle.

The court is persuaded that service of process upon

Snyderville West was invalid and the subsequent judgment is thus
void as to Snyderville West. "

Minute Entry, dated September 8,

1988 (R. 0979-R. 0980).
It is undisputed that Snyderville West, entered into a
Uniform Real Estate Contract to purchase the subject property in
1978 from Investor Associates.

Major signed the Contract as

agent for Investor Associates.

The subject property was paid

off and

Snyderville

West' s Warranty

Deed placed

of record in

1983, before entry of the default judgment.
This lawsuit was commenced in April, 1983.

The record

discloses that Plaintiff knew of the interest of Snyderville West
in the subject property.

Plaintiff knew the address at which

Snyderville West received its tax notices

(its "tax address"),

which was Snyderville West' s actual address and principal place
of business.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not in fact serve
Snyderville West.

It

is

undisputed

that

Plaintiff

attempt to serve Snyderville West of its address.
undisputed

- 13 -

not

It is likewise

that Plaintiff did not intend to serve

West, when it served defendant Jim Gaddis.

did

Snyderville

Among other things,

Plaintiff s attorney Davis in his Motion and Affidavit in 1983
represented

to

the

court

that

Plaintiff

was

unable

to

serve

Snyderville West. Plaintiff could have served Snyderville West at
its actual address, if she had tried to.

But Plaintiff did not

try to.
Notwithstanding
otherwise

in

the

Plaintiff s

attempts

Brief

of

Plaintiff

of Appellant,

to

service

show

on the

defendant Jim Gaddis is not the same as service on the defendant
Snyderville
individual

West.

Gaddis

capacity,

as

was

served

a defendant

individually,

separate

and

in

apart

his
from

Snyderville West.
Although

Plaintiff

is

her

Brief

suggests

otherwise,

there is no evidence or testimony in the record that indicates
that Snyderville West had attempted to keep its identity or its
property ownership a secret.

Snyderville West put its Notice of

purchase of the subject property of record in

1978, and took

title to the subject property and recorded its Warranty Deed in
1983.

Snyderville West was listed on the tax rolls of Summit

County as the owner of the subject property, from which records
Plaintiff in fact obtained Snyderville West' s true address.
Contrary

to

the

arguments

of

Plaintiff,

Utah

law

requires "due diligence" on the part of a Plaintiff to effect
personal service of process.
Substitute service by publication and mailing was not
effective, when by application of the most rudimentary levels of
diligence the defendant Snyderville West could have been served
- 14 -

at its address.
But in any event, the record shows that service of
process was mailed to the wrong address.
The remaining issue on this appeal is that because the
trial court dismissed the Complaint without elaborating on the
grounds for dismissal, beyond reference to the memoranda of the
parties, the dismissal must be set aside.
supports

either

dismissal.

of

Snyderville

But the record amply

West' s two stated

grounds

for

But even if the trial court should have stated the

grounds for dismissal as a condition precedent to an effective
dismissal, the trial court should be given the opportunity to set
forth the grounds for dismissal.
A R G U M E N T
I.
THE JUDGMENTS OF THE LOWER
COURT IN SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT TAKEN AGAINST SNYDERVILLE
WEST, AND LATER IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AGAINST
SNYDERVILLE WEST, IN THE ABSENCE OF
CLEAR ERROR MUST BE AFFIRMED.
Snyderville West moved the Court pursuant to Rule 60 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for an Order Setting Aside the
Default Judgment entered against Snyderville West.
Snyderville
process

West's

renders

motion

the

were

default

that

The bases for

(i) invalid

judgment

void

service

pursuant

to

of

Rule

60(b)(5), (ii) that time limitations under Rule 60(b) as to when
relief
process

must

be

sought

is invalid

Snyderville

West

have

no

application

and the judgment
has

a

meritorious
- 15 -

where

is void,
defense

and
to

service

of

(iii) that
the

action.

For defendants whose whereabouts are known or who can be readily
found,
service

personal
by

service

publication.

is

required

The

United

rather

than

States

Supreme

Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Company,

constructive
Court

339 U.S. 306

in

(1950)

supported this finding by reasoning:
It would be idle to pretend that
publication alone. .. is a reliable
means of acquainting interested
parties of the fact that their
rights are before the courts...
chance
a l o n e brings
to the
attention of even a local resident
an advertisement in small type
inserted in the back pages of a
newspaper, and if he makes his home
outside
the
areas
of
the
newspaper' s normal circulation the
odds that the information will
never
reach
him
are
large
indeed. ..in
weighing
its
sufficiency on the basis of
equivalence of actual notice, we
are unable to regard this as more
than feint. Id. at 315.
The preference for personal service over service by publication
is

reflected

both

in

the

publication and in case law.

statute

which

governs

notice

by

Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure provides that service by publication may be used
only after plaintiff has filed a verified motion and supporting
affidavit stating facts authorizing such service and showing "the
efforts that have been made to obtain personal
this state."

service within

The court must be "satisfied that due diligence has

been used to obtain personal service within this state" or that
the efforts to obtain personal service would be futile, before an
order for publication is granted.
- 18 -

The Utah Supreme Court has

written:
A Summons must be served upon a
defendant personally if he be
within the confines of the State
and not in hiding.
If he be
without the State or so conceals
himself within the State that
personal service cannot be had upon
him,
then
jurisdiction
is
o b t a i n e d . . . b y publishing
the
summons in a newspaper. . . [emphasis
added].
Lloyd

v

Third

Judicial

District

Court

in

and

For

Salt

Lake

County, 495 P. 2d 1262, 1262-63 (Utah 1972).
The Affidavit filed by Plaintiff in this case (R. 0273)
was

insufficient

publication
Affidavit

with

merely

to

justify

respect
recited

to

an

order

allowing

Snyderville

the statutory

West.

language

stating that after exercising "due diligence"

by

Plaintiff s
of Rule

4(f)

in locating the

current addresses of the Defendants, Plaintiff was:
Informed and believes that each of
the d e f e n d a n t s
listed
above
[including Snyderville West] either
resides outside the State of Utah,
has departed from the State of
Utah, has concealed himself to
avoid service of process, cannot
after due diligence be found within
the State, and/or is a corporation
having no officer or agent upon
whom process can be served,
(emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court has written:

C o n c e r n i n g t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of
plaintiff's
affidavit
of
j u r i s d i c t i o n a l facts: we recognize
t h a t such an a f f i d a v i t i s not
s u f f i c i e n t i f i t s t a t e s mere
conclusions as to d i l i g e n t search
and inquiry.
I t must set forth
- 19 -

service

j udgment void.
Generally, service of process must
be substantially in accordance with
the requirements of the law; if
s e r v i c e is i n s u f f i c i e n t
and
unauthorized by law, the court does
not acquire jurisdiction and the
judgment rendered is without
validity, force or effect.
62 Am
Jur 2d "Process", §30.
IV.
THE MAY 18, 1984 PURPORTED
SERVICE BY P U B L I C A T I O N
UPON
SNYDERVILLE WEST WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUBJECT SNYDERVILLE WEST TO THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.
A.

Failure of Plaintiff to Exercise "Due Diligence".

Rule 4(f) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires as
a condition precedent to the use of "other service"

(service by

publication and service by mailing a copy of the summons and
complaint), that the movant shall have exercised "due diligence"
in attempting to personally serve a defendant who could be found
in the State.

Rule 4(f)(1).

In this case, the testimony of

Plaintiff's attorney demonstrates that, far from exercising "due
diligence"
address"

Plaintiff

information

did

nothing

to

for Snyderville

follow
West,

up

on

nor did

its

"tax

it pursue

information from the title documents of record which identified
and

disclosed

Snyderville

West's

interest

in

the

subject

property.
The

address

which

Plaintiff s

Affidavit

lists

as

Snyderville West's "last known address", 1253 East 2100 South,
Salt

Lake

address.

City,

Utah

84106,

was

in

fact

This address was not a bogus one.
- 24 -

Snyderville

West's

In fact, Plaintiff

was able to serve Gaddis personally at that very address.
Plaintiff

(to

the

best

knowledge

of

Gaddis)

never

Yet,

made

any

inquiries with Gaddis or anyone else at the 1253 East 2100 South
location with respect to the whereabouts of Snyderville West.
Further,
executed

Plaintiff's

documents

predecessor in interest, Major,

(the Contract

and

the Notice

of

Contract)

which designated Snyderville West as the Buyer of the Snyderville
West

property,

gave

an

address

and

telephone

number

for

Snyderville West, and identified Gaddis as a principal person
connected with Snyderville West.

These same documents identified

Reese Howell and Title Insurance Agency as being involved in the
purchase transaction.

Any of these persons or entities could

through an inquiry have directed Plaintiff to Snyderville West
for the purpose of personal service of process.

Presumptively,

as successor to the deceased Major, Plaintiff had (or should have
had) access to these documents.

Plaintiff s failure to act on

these

for

sources

of

information,

whatever

reason,

hardly

constitutes "due diligence11 on the part of Plaintiff.
According to the testimony of Plaintiff7 s lawyer, at
some time before June, 1982, Plaintiff s attorney searched the
Summit County records, and, based on this search, Plaintiff s
attorneys identified the legal description of Parcel No. 6 of the
Complaint (the subject property), which at that time was held at
record

in

the

obtained

a

effective

date

name

of

Commitment
of

June

Joseph

L.

for

Title

10,

1982
- 25 -

Krofcheck.

Then

Insurance,

S-5383

(Davis

deposition,

Plaintiff
with
R.

an

1030,

Exhibit No. 23) (the "1982 Title Report").

The 1982 Title Report

disclosed the name of Snyderville West as having an interest in
Parcel No.

6 of the Complaint

(also Parcel No. 6 of the 1982

Title Report),

as disclosed in paragraphs

Exceptions"

Schedule

of

B -

Section

53 and 83 ("Special

2) thereof.

Thereupon

Plaintiff s attorneys went to the Summit County Assessor' s Office
and obtained the tax address of Snyderville West, being 1253 East
2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.

Exactly when Plaintiffs

attorneys obtained such address is not clear, but it was between
May,

1983

and

Plaintiff

October

moved

publication.

to

14,

1983,

serve

or

in

Defendant

other

words,

Snyderville

before

West

by

(Davis deposition, R. 1030, pp. 22, 23, 28, 35-39,

58, 59, 65).
Thus,
Snyderville

Plaintiff s

West

claimed

counsel

had

an interest

actual

in

knowledge

Parcel

No.

6,

that
as a

purchaser on a Uniform Real Estate Contract.
The testimony of Plaintiff s attorney Davis, is that at
this point Plaintiff did nothing further to attempt to find out
information

concerning

the

identity

and

whereabouts

of

Snyderville West, or indeed to ascertain whether Snyderville West
could be served personally at 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84106.

The record of what Plaintiff could have done,

and failed to do, establishes clearly that Plaintiff failed in
its requirement to exercise due diligence.
B,

Snyderville West Did Not Conceal Itself to Avoid
the Service of Process.

Rule 4(f)(1) provides

that where a person upon whom

- 26 -

service

is

sought

process,"

service

Plaintiff

has

"conceals
of

himself

process

suggested

in

may
her

to
be

avoid
made

Brief

of

the
by

service of

publication.

Appellant

that

Snyderville West has "concealed itself."
The facts of this case, as set forth supra, refute this
suggestion.

As

discussed

more

fully

above,

since

1978

Snyderville West' s identity was a matter of public record in the
Summit County Recorder' s Office.

Snyderville West gave notice of

its

when

contract

purchase

interest

it

first

purchased

the

subject property in 1978, and when Snyderville West took title by
Warranty Deed in 1983, it recorded the Warranty Deed.

From and

after 1978, Snyderville West paid taxes on the subject property,
and its name and address were a matter of public record.

Its

"tax notice address" was in fact its actual address.
There is absolutely no evidence that Snyderville West
"concealed itself" or "hid" to avoid the service of process.
Plaintiff s suggestions in her Brief of Appellant that
Snyderville West was "hiding" (Brief of Appellant at 49), or that
"Snyderville West played hide and seek"

(Brief of Appellant at

37) are totally unsupported by the record, and in light of the
facts in this case, when it was Plaintiff which brought suit and
pursued

default judgment

basis for the lawsuit, are
C.

against Snyderville West without any
simply outrageous.

The Summons and Complaint Directed at Snyderville
West Were Mailed to an Incorrect Address.

An additional requirement of Rule 4(f) with respect to
service by publication is that "within ten days after the order
- 27 -

is

entered,

the Clerk

shall

mail

a copy

of the

Summons

and

Complaint to each person whose address has been stated in the
motion. '• Although the Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff' s Motion
for Order Permitting Service by Publication stated Snyderville
West's

last known address

as

1253 East 2100 South,

Salt Lake

City, Utah 84106, the Affidavit of Mailing filed by the Clerk of
the Court certifying that the Summons and Complaint were mailed
lists the mailing address for Snyderville West as 1253 East 7100
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106.
The only definite evidence before the Court in this
Appeal

as

to

the

actual

address

to

which

the

Summons

and

Complaint were mailed is the Affidavit of Mailing filed by the
Clerk of the Court, which certified that the envelope containing
the Summons and Complaint directed to Snyderville West was sent
to the incorrect

address.

Plaintiff

has gamely

attempted to

suggest that this was a mere mistake in the Affidavit of Mailing,
but

the

fact

remains

that

Plaintiff s attorneys

prepared

the

Affidavit of Mailing as well as the envelopes addressed to the
several

Defendants,

Affidavit,

including

as subscribed

Snyderville

West,

and sworn to by the Clerk,

and

the

gives an

address that is not Snyderville West' s true address.
As set forth more fully in the Chronology of Relevant
Facts

supra.

Plaintiff's

attorneys

are

unable

to

state

conclusively that the envelope directed at Snyderville West was
in fact sent to Snyderville West' s correct address.

Nor is there

any unequivocable evidence from the United States Post Office as
- 28 -

to where the Snyderville West envelope was sent.
There is no definite evidence that Gaddis
else

on behalf

of Snyderville

West

received

or anyone

the Summons and

Complaint which was mailed to Snyderville West.

The Affidavit

and deposition testimony of Gaddis are that neither he nor anyone
in

his office

have

any record

of receiving

the Summons and

Complaint by mail, nor does Gaddis recall ever receiving such an
envelope.

Presumptively, based on the evidence properly before

this Court on appeal, the requirements for mailing the Summons
and Complaint as set forth and required by Rule 4(f) were not
satisfied,

and therefore

there

was no effective

service by

publication pursuant to Rule 4(f).
D.

The Distinction Attempted by Plaintiff Between In
Personam
and In Rem is not Valid Nor is it
Relevant to This Case.

The distinction attempted by Plaintiff in her Brief of
Appellant between in

personam

relevant to this case.
this clear.

and in

rem is not valid nor is it

The Mullane case discussed supra makes

As stated in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,

462 U.S. 791, 77 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1983):
The d e c i s i o n i n Mullane r e j e c t e d
one of t h e premises u n d e r l y i n g t h i s
court' s
previous
decisions
concerning the requirements
of
notice in judicial
proceedings:
t h a t due process r i g h t s may vary
depending on whether a c t i o n s a r e in
rem or in personam.
Beginning with Mullane. t h i s Court
has r e c o g n i z e d ,
contrary to the
e a r l i e r l i n e of c a s e s , t h a t "an
a d v e r s e judgment in rem d i r e c t l y
affects
t h e p r o p e r t y owner by
- 29 -

divesting him of his rights in the
p r o p e r t y before the Court,"
[citation omitted].
In rejecting
the traditional justification for
distinguishing between residents
and non residents and between in
rem and in personam
actions, the
Court has not left all interested
claimants to the vagaries of
indirect notice.
Our cases have
required the state to make efforts
to provide actual notice to all
interested parties comparable to
the efforts that were previously
required only in in
personam
actions, (at 796, N. 3 ).
Further, an examination of the pleadings in light of
the information available to Plaintiff and the other facts of
this case indicate that this is not properly an in
any

event.

The

information

available

to

rem action in

Plaintiff

before

commencement of her lawsuit, as supported by the Chronology of
Relevant

Facts

Plaintiff

only

supra,
had

ai

reveal
most

that

as

a seller7 s

to

Snyderville

claim

under

the

West
1978

Uniform Real Estate Contract by Investor Associates in favor of
Snyderville

West.

Plaintiff

had

actual

knowledge

of

the

existence of this Contract, through her actual knowledge of a
recorded Notice of Contract, as shown in the 1982
Title Report

(in "Special

Exceptions" No.

83) which

Plaintiff

obtained and reviewed prior to commencing this lawsuit in 1983
(R. 1030, pp. 15-17, 61-62, 65-67, 73).
constructive

notice

through

the

Further, Plaintiff had

recording

of

the

Notice

of

Contract in 1978.
Plaintiff

has

failed

in her

Complaint

to

allege a

breach of contract, and the Complaint in fact fails to state a
- 30 -

cause of action against Snyderville West.

Under Utah law, the

seller of real estate does not have an interest in land, but only
the seller' s right under a contract, which is a personal right.
Butler v. Wilkinson. 740 P. 2d 1244 (Utah 1987).

As stated by the

Court in Butler (at 1255):
The
d o c t r i n e
of
e q u i t a b l e
conversion
characterizes
the
s e l l e r ' s i n t e r e s t as an i n t e r e s t i n
personalty
and
not
as
one
in
realty,
whereas
the
vendee's
interest
under
the
executory
c o n t r a c t i s deemed an i n t e r e s t
in
realty.. . .
The v e n d o r ' s r e t e n t i o n
of
the
legal
title
is
usually
coupled with a contract r i g h t
to
forfeit
t h e vendee' s i n t e r e s t
and
t o t a k e back the vendee' s i n t e r e s t s
i f t h e vendee d e f a u l t s .

The
vendor's
interest
similar to the security i n t e r e s t
a p u r c h a s e money m o r t g a g e e .

is
of

V.
THE JANUARY 12, 1986 JUDGMENT
ENTERED UPON THE STIPULATION FOR
SETTLEMENT SIGNED BY ATTORNEY
STRONG (WHO REPRESENTED,
INTER
ALIA.
GADDIS PERSONALLY) DID NOT
BIND SNYDERVILLE WEST.

Plaintiff
claimed
other

that

in

because

defendants)

by

her
Gaddis

in Parcel

through

West,

notice"

for

purposes

was

attorney

c l a i m e d an i n t e r e s t
Snyderville

arguments

of

represented

Strong,
No.

that

before

and

the

(along

that

6 (the subject

somehow t h i s

satisfying

r e q u i r e m e n t s of S n y d e r v i l l e West.
- 31 -

legal

lower

court

with

because

Gaddis

property)

equates
service

many

only

to

"actual

of

process

However, Strong had no knowledge of Snyderville West
(R. 1030/ pp. 46, 85), and Strong did not represent Snyderville
West in this case (R. 0974; R. 1030, p. 46).

Further, title to

Parcel No. 6 was never discussed in the settlement negotiations,
and at least in the eyes of defendant Joseph L. Krofcheck and
attorney Don Strong there was never an intent that good title of
value to Parcel 6 specifically was on the table or would devolve
to Plaintiff
R.

0974

(Strong Affidavits, R. 0710 - 0711 paragraphs 5-9,

- 0975,

paragraph

6;

Krofcheck

Affidavits,

R.

0706-

0707, paragraph 4-7, R. 0968 - 0969, paragraphs 4 - 8 ) .
Beyond the foregoing, mere "actual notice" of an action
is not sufficient, in the absence of proper service of process.
See Murdock, supra: see also, e.g., Park, supra.
Plaintiff now for purposes of this appeal has recast
her "actual notice" argument into an argument that Snyderville
West, as "an undisclosed principal" is "bound by contracts and
conveyances made on his account by an agent acting within his
authority..."

(Brief of Appellant, at 40).

Plaintiff

did

not

raise

this

argument

in the lower

court, and is now precluded from making this argument on appeal.
There is no basis for this argument anyway.

But, if Plaintiff

had felt that her "undisclosed principal" argument was worthy of
advancement, she should have advanced this argument before the
lower court.

An argument not made before the trial court may not

be heard on appeal.
First of all, Snyderville West was not, and cannot be
- 32 -

considered to have been, an "undisclosed principal."

Plaintiff

determined whom she wished to sue, and she sued Snyderville West
as well as Gaddis.
West's

claim

to

Plaintiff had actual knowledge of Snyderville
ownership

of

the

subject

property

prior

to

commencing the lawsuit in 1983, through the 1982 Title Report.
Snyderville

West

was

not

"undisclosed"

to

Plaintiff,

and

so

Plaintiff s argument is not applicable to this case.
Apart from the foregoing, Plaintiff s argument fails in
that Plaintiff attempts to carry agency and contract theory over
to attorney representation of particular clients, where in this
case it is simply not applicable.
represented

Gaddis

The facts remain that Strong

personally,

who

was

sued

by

Plaintiff

personally, and Strong entered into the Settlement with respect
to Gaddis personally (as to his personal interest in property, if
any).

Strong did not represent the interest of Snyderville West

nor Snyderville West's ownership in the subject property.
this section, supra.

See

And the property was in the name of and

owned by Snyderville West, not Gaddis.
Plaintiff

now

argues

in

this

appeal

that

Gaddis,

through Strong' s action in Settlement &n his behalf only, has
bound Snyderville West, which partnership was (a) never served,
(b) never intended by Gaddis or Strong to be bound by Strong' s
actions in settlement, and

(c) never intended lay. Plaintiff at

that time to be bound by the Settlement.

It is undisputed that

Snyderville

the

nothing

West,

not

being

a party

to

Settlement,

took

(got no benefit) from the Stipulation for Settlement.
- 33 -

Nor did Gaddis take anything through the Settlement.

And yet

Plaintiff is seeking to take away Snyderville West' s property,
for which Snyderville West at the time of the Settlement had paid
the full purchase price of $120, 000 and had obtained title by
Warranty Deed.

Plaintiff should not be permitted to ignore the

facts and equities of this case in making her arguments.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT
ERROR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
AGAINST SNYDERVILLE WEST IN NOT
GIVING ANY GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL
BEYOND MAKING REFERENCE TO THE
MEMORANDA.
By Motion to Dismiss filed May 12, 1989, Snyderville
West moved to dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint against Snyderville
West for the reasons that (i) there was no compliance with Rule
4(b)" of
Complaint

the

Utah

failed

Rules

to

state

of

Civil

Procedure

a

claim

upon which

granted against Snyderville West.
Memorandum

in Support

and

(ii)

relief

the

can be

Snyderville West submitted a

of its Motion

(R. 0998),

and

Plaintiff

submitted a Memorandum in Opposition to Snyderville West' s Motion
(R. 1005).
to

Snyderville West then submitted a Memorandum in Reply

Plaintiff's

Opposition

to

Snyderville

Dismiss.

(R. 1014).

Entry {R.

1019), in which it stated as follows:

West's

Motion

to

On June 5, 1989, the Court made its Minute

"After NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR
DECISION is received and respective
MEMORANDA reviewed, Court rules as
follows:
1.
Defendant
West's MOTION TO
granted.
- 34 -

Snyderville
DISMISS is

2.
Counsel for defendant to
prepare appropriate Order.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
in pertinent part as follows:
The trial court need not enter
findings of fact and conclusions of
law in rulings on motions, except
as provided in Rule 41(b).
The
court shall, however, issue a brief
written statement of the ground for
its decisions on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a)
and (b), 5 6, and 5 9 when the motion
is based on more than one ground.
In

this

instance,

Judge

Frederick

as

his

"brief

written statement of the ground for its decision" referred to the
above-referenced memoranda.

Viewed in the light most favorable

to the trial court in supporting the trial court' s ruling, the
arguments of Snyderville West as advanced in its two memoranda
must be taken as the grounds and basis for the trial court' s
decision to grant Snyderville West' s Motion to Dismiss.
As is amply documented in the record, and supported by
Snyderville West' s said two memoranda, either the application of
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure QJO the failure of
the Complaint to state a cause of action as to Snyderville West
are

adequate

grounds

Snyderville West.

for dismissal

of

the

Complaint

against

See Snyderville West memoranda, at R. 0998-

1002; R. 1014-1018.
A-

Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Requires
that the Complaint be Dismissed.
Rule 4(b) provides as follows:
(b)

Time

of

- 35 -

Issuance

and

Service. If an action is commenced
by the filing of a complaint,
summons must issue thereon within
three months from the date of such
filing. The summons must be served
within one year after filing of the
complaint or the action will be
deemed dismissed, provided that in
any action brought against two or
more defendants in which personal
service has been obtained upon one
of them within the year, the other
or others may be served or appear
at any time before trial.
It is apparent from the rule that it is too late to
serve

a

defendant

after

trial.

Defendant

Snyderville

West

respectfully submits that it is too late to serve a defendant
after

judgment.

In

this

action,

judgment

pursuant

to

the

settlement agreement of all those parties to this lawsuit that
had

properly

been

served,

was

entered

on

January

14, 1986.

Service on Snyderville West was not effectuated until March 27,
1989.
The term "judgment" has been defined as:

[T]he law's l a s t word in a j u d i c i a l
controversy; i t is the final
consideration and determination of
a court of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n
upon the matter submitted to i t i n
an action or proceeding.
Thus, a
j u d g m e n t of d i s m i s s a l
with
prejudice i s a final judgment of
the court.
An agreed judgment or
consent judgment i s a judgment
e n t e r e d on a g r e e m e n t of t h e
parties.
I t is nothing technical,
but merely an agreement of the
parties
which r e c e i v e s
the
sanction of the court.
I t is a
contract between the p a r t i e s to an
agreement,
operates
as
an
adjudication between them and, when
the court gives the agreement i t s
-
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sanction, becomes a judgment of the
court.
The fact that the judgment
is by consent gives neither greater
nor less force than if rendered
after protracted litigation, except
to the extent that it excuses error
and operates to end all controversy
between the parties.
It has the
same weight and effect as any other
judgment and, unless vacated or set
aside,
stands
as
a
final
determination of the rights of the
parties.
Tyavel^r' ? In§T gpT v,,
United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 2829 (S.D.Tex. 1968) [citations
omitted].
Like the terms
term

"trial"

adjudication

denotes
of

the

a

"judgment"
process

issues.

The

or "agreed judgment,"

which

operates

judgment

in

as

this

a

the

final

case was

functionally equivalent to a trial as that term is used in Rule
4(b).
B.

Plaintiff's Complaint Fails to State a Cause of Action
Against Snyderville West.
The complaint in this action merely states that title

should be quieted in the Plaintiff.

At this point in time, as

the record reflects, there are extensive affidavits and exhibits
which

reflect

the

fact

that

Snyderville

subject property and paid for it.

West

See supra.

purchased

the

Snyderville West

believes that the Complaint in this case is grossly inadequate.
The Complaint, in order to state a claim in which relief can be
granted, must state some factual or legal basis that the land
purchased,

paid

for and

deeded

belong to Snyderville West.

to

Snyderville

West

To merely allege that

does

not

Plaintiff

wishes to quiet title without further reasoning or explanation is
- 37 -

unsatisfactory.
This
proceedings.

is

especially

true

at

this

point

in

the

Plaintiff served a copy of her original complaint

on Snyderville West in 1989, after all of the proceedings and
evidence leading up to the court' s setting aside of the default
judgment.

The factual evidence brought before the court made it

clear that Snyderville West bought and paid for its property.
serve

a

Plaintiff

"quiet
had

title
all

complaint"

the

facts

on

Snyderville

concerning

West,

Snyderville

To
when

West' s

purchase of the subject property before herself, is improper.
It is well established that a pleading should not be
filed unless the party and counsel believe that after reasonable
inquiry,

"it

is

existing

law

or

well
a

grounded

good

faith

in

fact

and

argument

modification, or reversal of existing law."

for

is

warranted

the

by

extension,

Rule 11 U. R. C. P. and

Rule 40(a) Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

Snyderville West

believes that a requirement for a proper Complaint in this case
against defendant Snyderville West, is that this complaint must
state some grounds for relief in light of the Plaintiff s and
counsel' s knowledge at this point that Snyderville West purchased
the property, paid for it and has had the property deeded to it.
As stated above, in Section IV(D) supra. Plaintiff had
both

actual

and

constructive

knowledge

of

Snyderville

West' s

contract interest, but failed in her Complaint to allege a breach
of contract.

Under Utah law, the seller of an estate does not

have an interest in land, but only the seller' s right under a
- 38 -

contract, which is a personal right.
But even if the trial
grounds

for

dismissal

as

Butler v. Wilkinson, supra.

court should have stated the

a condition

precedent

to

effect

a

dismissal, pursuant to Rule 52 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the trial court should be given the opportunity to set forth the
grounds for dismissal, rather than setting aside the dismissal as
sought by Plaintiff.

The trial court clearly had good reasons

for ruling for Snyderville West, and if required by this Court
should be given the opportunity to set forth those reasons.
CONCLUSION
As found by the trial court below, Plaintiff was not
entitled to have default judgment against Snyderville West in
this

case.

Given that Plaintiff

Snyderville

West,

but

failed

to

had

the correct

attempt

personal

address

of

service

of

Snyderville West at that address, and instead attempted service
by

mail,

but

used

the

incorrect

address,

the

trial

court

correctly found that Plaintiff was not entitled to have default
judgment.
It is undisputed that Snyderville West entered into a
Uniform Real Estate Contract to purchase the subject property in
1978 from Investor Associates, whose agent was Robert W. Major,
Jr., now deceased, the decedent of the Estate of Major.

A Notice

of the Real Estate Contract was placed of record in 1978 in the
Summit County

Recorder' s Office.

The purchase price

for the

subject property was $120,000.00, of which $20,000.00 was paid as
a down payment by Snyderville West in 1978 and the balance was
- 39 -

paid

in installments

together with

interest

1983, with the final payment made in August,

between
1983.

1978 and
Following

payment in full of the purchase price, Snyderville West obtained
a Warranty Deed.

That Deed was placed of record prior to entry

of the default judgment.
This lawsuit was commenced by Plaintiff in April, 1983.
The

record

discloses

that

Plaintiff

knew

of

the

interest

of

Snyderville West in the subject property through an investigation
by Plaintiff s attorneys and through the 1982 Title Report which
Plaintiff
case.

obtained

Plaintiff

which was

in

connection with

the preparation

knew the "tax address"

Snyderville West' s actual

of her

of Snyderville West,

address, and knew of the

identity of other persons to whom Plaintiff could have obtained
information

about

Snyderville

West.

Snyderville

West

at all

relevant times could have been personally served with Summons and
Complaint at Snyderville West' s known address.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not in fact serve
Snyderville West.

The testimony of attorney T. Richard Davis who

was principally responsible for obtaining service of process on
the several defendants, was that no Summons was ever prepared for
Snyderville West.

Further, Davis in his Affidavit represented to

the Court that Plaintiff was unable to serve Snyderville West,
which was not true.
It is likewise undisputed that Plaintiff did not intend
to serve Snyderville West, when it served defendant Jim Gaddis
personally.

Gaddis

was

one

of

- 40 -

seventy

defendants

which

Plaintiff named.

Plaintiff prepared the Summons for Gaddis, as a

Summons personally for Gaddis and not in his capacity as agent,
managing

partner

or otherwise

for Snyderville

West.

Gaddis'

Summons was served at Gaddis' business address, 12 53 East 2100
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, which was the precise address
of Snyderville West.
Plaintiff

could have served

Snyderville West at its

actual address, if it had tried to.

Plaintiff knew from the

Return of Service on Gaddis that someone was at that address, and
that service of process could be had at that address.

All that

Plaintiff would have needed to have done would have been to send
a

process

server

to

Snyderville

West's

known

address,

where

service in fact could have been had readily on Snyderville West.
Notwithstanding
otherwise

in

Plaintiff s

the

attempts

Brief

of

Plaintiff

of Appellant,

service

to

show

on the

defendant Jim Gaddis is not the same as service on the defendant
Snyderville
individual

West.

Gaddis

capacity,

Snyderville West.

as

was

served

a defendant

individually,

separate

and

in

apart

his
from

Plaintiff did not intend to serve Snyderville

West by service on Gaddis, and in fact made representations and
produced Affidavits to the court that Snyderville West had not
been served
There was

(although

nothing

the defendant

in the Summons

Gaddis

had

to indicate

been served).
to Gaddis

that

service was being made on Snyderville West.
Although Plaintiff in her Brief of Appellant suggests
otherwise, there is no evidence or testimony in the record that
- 41 -

indicates that Snyderville West attempted to keep its identity or
its property

ownership

avoid service.

a secret, much less

conceal

itself to

Snyderville West put its Notice of real estate

purchase of the subject property of record in

1978, and took

title to the property and recorded its Warranty Deed in 1983.
Snyderville West was listed on the tax rolls of Summit County as
the owner of the property, from which records Plaintiff in fact
obtained Snyderville West' s true address.
Contrary
requires

the

to

the

exercise

of

argument
"due

by

Plaintiff,

diligence"

on

the

Utah
part

law
of a

plaintiff to effect personal service of process, and only when
that fails may Plaintiff move for alternative service of process.
Patently, Plaintiff failed to rise to even the lowest standard of
"due

diligence"

by

failure

to

even

prepare

a

Summons

and

Complaint directed at Snyderville West and take that process and
drive to Snyderville West' s address.

Plaintiff s failure to take

even these initial steps makes ridiculous Plaintiff s assertions
as raised in Plaintiff s Brief of Appellant that there was an
exercise of "due diligence."
It was this blatant failure to perform even the most
basic effort to comply with requirements for service of process
which supports Judge Murphy' s ruling setting aside the default
judgment, and the carefully worded language of his Minute Entry.
Substitute

service

by

publication

and

mail

is

not

effective, when by application of the most rudimentary levels of
diligence the defendant Snyderville West could have been served
- 42 -

at its address.

The Court as shown by its Minute Entry was

properly concerned that, at the least, the Motion and supporting
Affidavit of Plaintiff were misleading to the Court in suggesting
that

personal

service

had

been

attempted

Snyderville West' s last known address.
an

attempt

to

serve

Snyderville

address.

Because

the

Affidavit

foundation

for the Motion,

without

success

at

In fact, there was never

West

at

failed

that
to

or

any

have

the

other
proper

as to Snyderville West, the Court

should never have authorized service by publication.
But
Plaintiff's

even
self

if

the

serving

Court
Motion

properly
and

on

the

Affidavit

basis

could

of

have

determined that substituted service by mail would be proper, the
records shows that service of process was sent to the incorrect
address.
to

the

The only definite evidence in the record with respect
address

at

which

service

was

sent

is

the

Clerk' s

Certificate, which clearly shows that the process was sent to an
address other than Snyderville West' s last known address.
is

no

definite

evidence

that

Snyderville

West

ever

There

received

service of process by mail, and it must be concluded for purposes
of this appeal that it did not.
The remaining issue raised by Plaintiff on this appeal
was that because the trial court dismissed the Complaint without
elaborating on the ground for dismissal, beyond reference to the
memoranda of the parties, the dismissal must be set aside.

But

the record amply supports either of Snyderville West' s two stated
grounds for dismissal.

But even if the trial court should have
- 43 -

stated the grounds for dismissal with greater particularity as a
condition precedent to effect a dismissal, the trial court should
be given the opportunity to set forth the grounds for dismissal.
DATED this

<^ j

day of January, 1990.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.

.chard A. Rappa£a#:t/
William B. Wray, Jr.
Attorneys for Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

a

true

and

correct

foregoing document was hand delivered this
1990, to the following:
Robert F. Orton
Virginia Curtis Lee
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON
Fifth Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

snyder2. bri
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copy

of

the

day of January,

ADDENDUM
Summons served on Gaddis personally on May 11, 1983.
0050-0053).

(R.

Affidavit of Reese S. Howell, with attached Exhibits 1-4.
(R. 0625-0633).
Relevant pages from the June 10, 1982 Commitment for Title
Insurance ("1982 Title Report") addressed to Robert Orton,
attorney for Plaintiff, disclosing in Exceptions Nos. 53 and
83 the interest of Snyderville West. (R. 1030, Exhibit 23).
Clerk' s Affidavit of Mailing, showing that the Summons
directed at Snyderville West was sent to the wrong address.
(R. 0300-0303).
Excerpts from the deposition testimony of T. Richard Davis,
attorney for Plaintiff.
(R. 1030# pp 13, 14# 22# 23, 28,
35-39, 46, 48, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60-68, 85, 89, 90, 92).
Rules

tf**$l,

BOBERT F . ORTON
'f. RICHARD DAVIS
M A R S D E N , O R T O N 8c L I L J E N Q U I S T
ATTORNEYS FOR

t,«*H«*

C j l y ,

Uf*t»

Process 5ery«

PLAINTIFF

6B S O U T H M A I N , F I F T H F L O O R
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

MAYl/? 1983

T E L E P H O N E : (801) 5 2 1 - 3 8 0 0

-*erk oi Summit County

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN W. MAJOR, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased.
Plaintiff,

S U M M O N S

vs.
KNGLISH INN C O . , I N C . , a U t a h
C o r p o r a t i o n ; PARK CITY UTAH
CORPORATION, a U t a h C o r p o r a t i o n ;
CHARLES E . HIRSCH; HAROLD D.
HIRSCH; SAM A . HEPNER; EUGENE H.
rOWERT; MASASHI HA SHI DA; J . E .
ROBERTS a / k / a JACK E . ROBERTS;
rROSTWOOD LIMITED, a U t a h
l i m i t e d P a r t n e r s h i p ; J . L.
KROFCHECK a / k / a JOSEPH L .
KROFCHECK; ROBERT L . BARRETT;
^NYDERVILLE WEST; PARTNERSHIP
INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, I N C . , a
C o r p o r a t i o n ; PARK WEST WATER
ASSOCIATION, a U t a h N o n - P r o f i t
C o r p o r a t i o n ; HALBET ENGINEERING,
INC., a C a l i f o r n i a C o r p o r a t i o n ;
HALBET PROPERTIES, I N C . , a U t a h
C o r p o r a t i o n ; MAJOR-BLAKENEi
CORPORATION, a C a l i f o r n i a

C i v i l No.

/ -,/
/"7

0050

7325

« 4 j ( j

n

1
2
3
4
5
g
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., a
Utah Corporation; LESTER F.
HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT;
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a Utah
Limited Partnership; H. E. BABCOCK
and J. E. ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST
LAND COMPANY; INVESTOR ASSOCIATES,
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorporated Association; WILLIAM S.
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND
LOAN COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
J. ROBERT WEST; LIFE RESOURCES,
INC., an Oregon Corporation; KARL
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN,
Trustee; PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah
Corporation; WAYLAND P. CALKINS;
BARBARA CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
Trustee; AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
OF UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation;
JOHN CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY;
SKI PARK CITY WEST, INC., a Utah
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a California Limited Partnership; ROBERT
W. ENSIGN; CITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a Corporation;
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR LOTT
a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE
& ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah
I Corporation; PARK WEST ASSOCIATES,
j a Utah General Partnership; JAMES
WEBSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a JAY
BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER STILLWELL;
DIANA L. LESUEUR; Z. J. SLAGEL
a/k/a ZELLA J. SLAGEL; RAY WINN;
JOHN MULLER; GERALD W. WALTERS;
NEW YORK INVESTORS, INC., a New
York Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK;
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK;
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, Inclusive;
and all other persons unknown
claiming any right, title, or

0051
-2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

interest in or lien against the real
property described in Plaintiff's
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's
ownership or clouding his title
thereto; PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION,
a Utah Corporation; CITY DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation;
STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; GREAT
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; INN
INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah Corporation;
REESE HOWELL; AMERICAN SAVINGS &
LOAN, a Utah Corporation; JOE COX;
JIM GAQD.IS; SAM WILSON; HENRY
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 25 THROUGH 50,
Inclusive,

10
Defendants.
11
12

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS:

13

You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer
in writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the aboveentitled Court, and to serve upon or mail to either ROBERT F.
ORTON or T. RICHARD DAVIS, of the Law Firm of MARSDEN, ORTON &
LILJENQUIST, 68 South Main, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah
84101, a copy of said Answer within TWENTY (20) DAYS after service
of this Summons upon you.

14
15
16
17
18

If you fail so to do, Judgment by Default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has
been filed with the Clerk of said Court, and a copy of which is
attached and herewith served upon you.

19
DATED THIS

<>

day of May, 1983.

20
21
22
23
24

ROBERT F. ORTON
T. RICHARD DAVIS
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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STATE OF U T A H
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss

3SHVICE

Suit* 301
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 I I
Telephone: (801) 364-8250
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
Civil No. ~ 7 ^ ? ^ £

-

'(u\M fvlQf, hi^hereby make an affidavit of service, and certify

that:

received the:
GARNISHMENT
ORDER
2t~~ SUMMONS
_
CHECK
, SUBPOENA
_
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
MOTION
J ^ " COMPLAINT
_
SUBPOENA DEUCES TECUM
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
_
NOTICE OF
SMALL CLAIMS AFFIDAVIT & ORDER
AFFIDAVIT OF
MOTION AND ORDER IN SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS
OTHER:

and served it upon the respondent(s) listed below, on the date shown below, at the place
listed below, by leaving a copy with the respondent(s) personally, or by leaving a copy
with the agent of the respondent(s), or by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age
and discretion residing at the usual place of abode of the respondent(s).
2.
I am a duly qualified and acting peace officer, or am a person over the age of 21
years, and am not a party to this action.
3.

I endorsed the date and place of service and my name on the copy served.

Name of Respondent(s)

Where Served

Date Served

-STW/-0

/2S~Z> £\ ^ / ^ 5

Date Received
County of
UTAH

relationship:

•/-hCL £.

/fi^t

__. . _ ... ..
,
with agent of respondent 3 . _
^ ^
TYPE OF SERVICE:
persona
person of suitable age and discretion residing at the usual place of abj^ffrflfYtffCfoN!^
respondent(s) 4.
I showed the original subpoena to the respondent and j y W 5 > ^ Th^v ^y
respondent of its contents.

Fees:

Service

111 age
)ther
[OTflL

$ / • /^

Subscribed
secTaod sworn to befoxfi_me:

^y- }^X- \

5~U-%3

S5 7 ^
$ _ _
%CZZl

NOTARY PUBLIC Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My commission expires:
I \ / > r— r%

Lp- c?«&?~ ^^T

Richard A. Rappaport (Bar No. 2690)
William B* Wray, Jr. (Bar No. 3559)
Martha S. Stonebrook (Bar No. 5149)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT <5c SEGAL
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O.Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Defendant
Snyderville West
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased,

*

*

AFFIDAVIT OF
REESE S. HOWELL
IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF
DEFENDANT SNYDERVILLE WEST

Plaintiff,
vs.
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah
corporation, et al.,

Civil No. 7325

Defendants.

)
*

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

*

*

*

*

*

*

)
ss.
)

REESE S. HOWELL, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, being duly
sworn upon oath, deposes and says that the following facts, on personal knowledge, are
true:
1.

I am presently and at all times since January 1, 1978 have been a VI

President with Title Insurance Agency.

0625

EXHIBIT." H"

2.

I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, and the

area of my practice is in real property law.
3.

I personally assisted as an officer of Title Insurance Agency in that certain

transaction entered into on or about July 13, 1978, wherein Snyderville West, a
partnership, as buyer, and Investor Associates, as seller, executed a Uniform Real Estate
Contract (the "Contract"), a true copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

Tt n

l,

covering among other property a seven-acre parcel of property situated in Summit
County, State of Utah, together with an appurtenant easement, which seven-acre parcel
and easement are more particularly described in Exhibit "2" attached hereto (the
"Snyderville West Property").
4.

In said transaction, among other things, I witnessed the execution of the

Contract by Robert W. Major, Jr., who was also known as R. W. Major and Robert W.
Major, for and on behalf of Investor Associates, and I notarized the signature of Robert
W. Major, Jr. on a Notice of Uniform Real Estate Contract for and on behalf of the
seller, Investor Associates. A true copy of said Notice of Contract is attached hereto as
Exhibit "3". Said Notice was recorded in the Summit County Records, on July 14, 1978 as
Entry No. 147707.
5.

In connection with the preparation of the Memorandum of Snyderville West

in this case, I was requested to examine the title documents of record in the Summit
County Records pertaining to the Snyderville West Property.
6.

On the basis of my examination of title, it is my opinion that by virtue of a

Quit-Claim Deed dated November 1, 1976, recorded July 14, 1978 as Entry No. 147704 in
the Summit County Records, Joseph L. Krofcheck ("Krofcheck") was vested with and held
good title of record to the Snyderville West Property. Thereafter, Joseph L. Krofcheck

0026

by Quit-Claim Deed dated November 5, 1977, recorded July 14, 1978 as Entry No. 147706
in the Summit County Records conveyed the Snyderville West Property to Investor
Associates. Thereafter, Investor Associates by Quit-Claim Deed dated June 6, 1980,
recorded July 7, 1980 as Entry No. 168166 conveyed the Snyderville West Property (but
without express inclusion of the appurtenant easement) to J. L. Krofcheck. It is my
understanding and belief that Joseph L. Krofcheck and J. L. Krofcheck are one and the
same person.
Thereafter, by Warranty Deed (undated, but acknowledged October 26, 1983,
recorded January 19, 1984 as Entry No. 215912 in the Summit County Records), Joseph L.
Krofcheck conveyed and warranted the Snyderville West Property to Snyderville West.
7.

Based upon my examination of the title documents of record in the Summit

County Records, there are no instruments of conveyance other than those identified in
this Affidavit affecting or purporting to affect title to the Snyderville West Property
between the above-described Quit-Claim Deed which was Entry No. 147704 and the
above-described Warranty Deed which was Entry No. 215912.
8.

There is no document of record affecting the Snyderville West Property

which at the present time or at any time in the past vested or purported tp vest in the
decedent in this case, Robert W. Major, Jr., any right, title or interest in or to the
Snyderville West Property*
9.

My office of Title Insurance Agency after execution of the Contract acted

as a collection agent for Snyderville West and the seller, Investor Associates and
subsequently Krofcheck, until the Contract was paid in full in mid-1983. On or before
August 16, 1983 my office of Title Insurance Agency received two "Snyderville West"
account checks from James R. Gaddis for Snyderville West; one check in the amount of

"3" 0627

$32,210.00 representing payment of the balance in full of the Contract and one check for
$900.00 plus, for payment of certain tax amounts due the seller. Attached hereto as
Exhibit "4" is a true copy of a letter from me to Krofcheck dated August 16, 1983, which
supports these facts.

Reese SU Howell
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this %$ ^day of March, 1988.

My Commission E:

Residing ox-. qrfaJji

£&5^\

*-<£. j*J>

•

mar/Chicago-1

-4-
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ORIGINAL
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, persona]*
representative of the ESTATE*
&
OF ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR.,
deceased,

h
*****

%***$? 4*

iad*-

Plaintiff
Civil No. 7325
vs.
Deposition of:

fi

ENGLISH INN CO., INC. a
Utah corporation, et al.,
T. RICHftjgp D A V I S

F i t ED

Defendants.
* * *

AUG

^

"

"

11988
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 8th day of June/
BY

1988,

•

the deposition of T. RICHARD DAVIS, pro<ftBStefi,t*s a

ttj^u

witness herein at the instance of the Defendants in the
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court,
was taken before SHIRLYN SHARPE, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public
in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of
9:00 a.m. of said day at 525 E. 100 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
* * *

ASJ7

„ MERIT ^

SHIRLYN SHARPE

O REPORTERS O

(801) 322-3742

5 DAY DELIVERY

185South State Street • Suite 1020 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

1030

i. D. No. 177-cc N? 600235

.TL&.XL ILILE AJS.U ABSIBAGT Ga&KAttY
9 SOUTH MAIN STREET • BOX 545 • COALVILLE. UTAH 84017 • (801) 336-2532 ZENITH 864
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SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY
COMMITMENT FOR TITLE INSURANCE
Robert Orton
68 S. Main
5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah

S-5383

Various p a r c e l s i n
Summit County
J . L . Krofcheck

84101

\FECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, a California corporation, herein called the Company, for a valuable
>nsideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance in ALTA Single Form Policy-1970
averages, as identified in Schedule A, in favor of the proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee
the estate or interest covered hereby in the land described or referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the
emiums and charges therefor, all subject to the provisions of Schedule A and B, and the Conditions and Stipulations
>reof.
lis Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the policy or
)licies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, which Insured and said amount may
> changed by subsequent endorsement.
Vis Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability and
ligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six months after the effective date hereof or when the policy or
)licies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such policy or policies is not
e fault of the Company.
lis Commitment is further conditioned by the Conditions and Stipulations and Exclusions from Coverage of the basic
rm of the policy or policies committed to be issued. The examination of the public records made by Company as to
e land set out in Schedule A was made wholly for determining the insurability of the title to said land and not for
sporting on the condition of the record.
J WITNESS WHEREOF, SAFECO Title Insurance Company has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto
fixed by its duly authorized officers on the date shown in Schedule A.

WJM
President

Secretary

^ w .

•TJX

UVvV. .
° * -*CV\VWVxV^

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
ITP-90 (Rev. 1-79)

LI ~OAV;

S

Authorized Signatur^^/ —^

For i n q u i r e s c a l l Alan Spriggs
801-336-2532

SCHEDULE A

Order No.
Page

S-5383
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1.

Effective date: June 10, 1982 @ 8:00 a.m.

2.

Policy or policies to be issued: (check)
(a)

QX/XIEC&H

)

LITIGATION REPORT
X^OSaSBQGC

Name of proposed Insured:

)

XKSSgfeSX (
Amount: $1,451.25

TO BE DETERMINED
(b)

Mortgage-Standard Coverage (
Name of proposed Insured:

3.

)

Mortgage-Extended Coverage (

)

Amount: $

The estate or interest in the land described in this Commitment and covered herein is:

Fee Simple
4.

Title to the estate or interest referred to herein is at the effective date hereof vested in:
See Exhibit A attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.

5.

The land referred to in this Commitment is in the State of Utah, County of
and is described as follows:

Summit

See Exhibit B attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.

SCHEDULE A
Commitment (Utah)
UTP-90A (Rev. 6-79)

EXHIBIT A
VESTING
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah Corporation as to the East 1/2 of Lot 28, Park
City West Plat No. 1. (Affects a portion of Parcel 1)
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION as to the following:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of property conveyed to Spencer Osborn
in Special Warranty Deed recorded March 31, 1969, as Entry No. 108801, in
Book M20, at page 389, of the Official Records, said point being on the
North line of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M, at a point
West 2753 feet from the Northeast corner of said Section 1; and running
thence West 156 feet to the East line of property conveyed to Joseph L.
Krofcheck, Trustee, in Warranty Deed recorded as Entry No. 115698, in
Book M37, at page 650, of the Official Records; thence South along said
East line 713 feet; thence East 156 feet to a point due South of beginning;
thence North 713 feet to the point of beginning. (affects a part of Parcel 3)
AND:
Beginning at a point 2753 feet West of the Northeast corner of Section 1,
Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M; and running thence East 289.5 feet;
thence South 504.5 feet; thence West 289.5 feet; thence North 504.5 feet
to the point of beginning.
AND:
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M; The North 165 feet
of the Southwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section
36; and the South 1/2 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 36; and the West 100 feet of the North 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 36. (being a
portion of Parcel 4)
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a Utah Limited Partnership as to the following:
A portion of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M, Summit County,
Utah, as follows:
Commencing at the Northeast corner of the real property covered under the
Warranty Deed dated January 15, 1970, executed by Homer Ellsworth and Mary
L. Ellsworth, his wife, in favor of William S. Richards, Trustee, recorded
January 23, 1970, as Entry No. 110522, in Book M24, at page 564, of Summit
County records; thence East along the North line of said Section 1, 72.5
feet; thence, South 713 feet; thence West 72.5 feet; thence, along the
easterly boundary line of the property described in the aforesaid Warranty
Deed, Entry No. 110522, North 713 feet to the point of commencement.

CONTINUED

Exhibit A Continued

Also, commencing 72.5 feet east, of the above mentioned real property
Northeast corner as described in the Warranty Deed Entry No. 110522,
thence, 72.5 feet east from said beginning point to a point on the North
line of said Section 1; thence, 713 feet South; thence, 72.5 feet West;
thence, North 713 feet to the beginning point herein. (being a part of
Parcel 3)
AND:
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M; Beginning at the
Southeast corner of Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence North along
the East line of said Plat No. 2 for 204 feet; thence East 160 feet;
thence South 204.00 feet; thence in a straight line West to the point of
beginning. TOGETHER WITH an Easement 27.6 feet wide for ingress, egress
and underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of
a centerline commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 680.6 feet North,
more or less, to a right of way south line, which right of way is known as
"Major Drive" within said Park City West Plat No. 2, connecting with Park
City West Plat No. 1, said plats being recorded subdivision in the Summit
County records. (Bring Parcel 5)
CHARLES E. HIRSCH, HAROLD D. HIRSCH & SAM A. HEPNER, subject to the marital
interest of their spouses, if married as to the following:
Southwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Southeast 1/4 of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLBM, EXCEPTING THEREFROM: the South 1/2 thereof;
AND, the South 220 feet of the East 1/2 of the North 1/2 thereof. (Being a
part of Parcel 8)
EUGENEE H. POWERT & MASASHI HASHIDA, subject to the marital interest of their
spouses, if married as to the following:
That portion of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M, encompassed by the South 220 feet of the East 1/2 of the North 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of the Southeast 1/4 of said Section 36;
EXCEPT, there is reserved unto the grantors a non-exclusive easement for
ingress, egress and utilities over and across the Easterly 66 feet of the
said property, with the further right thereunto reserved by grantors to
dedicate such easement to public authority for use as a public right of way
at any time in the future. (Being a part of Parcel 8)

CONTINUED

Exhibit A Continued

J.E. ROBERTS, subject to the Dower Interest of his wife, if married as to:
The South 330 feet of the West 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4 of the Southeast
1/4 of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, SLB&M. (Being a part
of Parcel 8)
FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a Utah Limited Partnership, as to the Easterly approximately
900.8 feet of Parcel 9
AND
J.L.KROFCHECK, aka JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK, subject to the marital interest of
his wife if married as to the remainder.

Exhibit B Continued

underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of a centerline commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of
Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 680.6 feet North, more or less, to
a right of way south line, which right of way is known as "Major Drive" within
said Park City West Plat No. 2, connecting with Park City West Plat No. 1, said
plats being recorded subdivision in the Summit County records.
Parcel No. 6:
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East,
part of the Northwest quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, and
part of Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest
corner of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Summit County, Utah, and running thence North along Section line 502.3
feet; thence East 850.00 feet; thence South 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80
feet; thence South 0°17 , 58 n East 474.93 feet to the Southerly boundary of Seller's
land; thence South 57°30f West 32.8 feet; thence South 81°40f West 299.5 feet;
thence North 27°28f West 100.6 feet to the West line of the above mentioned
Section: thence North 0°30f East 82.4 feet along section line to point of beginning.
Parcel No. 7:
The Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 36, Township 1 South,
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, less the North 594.0 feet thereof.
Parcel No. 8:
The South half of the West half of the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter
of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel No. 9:
In Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Beginning at a point on the West line of State Highway 248, which point is 2,608.8
feet North and 1,412.0 feet, more or less, East of the Southwest corner of said
Section 31; thence Northerly along the said West line of Highway 248 for 388.5
feet; thence West 1,412.0 feet, more or less, to a point on the West line of said
Section 31; thence South 538.5 feet, more or less, along said Section 31 West line:
thence East 901 feet; thence North 150 feet; thence East 511 feet, more or less,
to the point of beginning hereof.

All parcels limited to surface rights only.

SCHEDULE B-SECTION I

Order No.
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Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following matters unless the same are
disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company (all clauses, if any, which indicate any preference, limitation or
discrimination based on race, color, religion or national origin are omitted from all building and use restrictions,
covenants and conditions, if any, shown herein):
A.

Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the public
records, or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the proposed Insured acquires
of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment

B.

STANDARD EXCEPTIONS:
1.

Rights or claims of persons in possession or claiming to be in possession, easements, liens or encumbrances
including material or labor liens, which are not shown by the public records; reservations in patents or state
grants, or in acts authorizing the issuance thereof; mineral rights, water rights, clams or title to minerals or
water.*

2.

Questions of location, boundary and areas; overlaps and encroachments by improvements belonging to
these or adjoining premises; all dependent upon actual survey for determination.*

3.

Assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the public records; taxes not yet payable; pending
proceedings for vacating, opening or changing streets or highways preceding entry of the final ordinance or
order therefor.*
•Paragraphs 1,2, and 3 will not appear as printed exceptions on extended coverage policies, except as to
such parts thereof which may be typed as a Special Exception in Schedule B-Section Z

C.

SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS:
(See Schedule B-Section 2 beginning on next p^ge)

SCHEDULE B - SECTION I
Commitment (Utah)

UTP-90B-1 (Rev. 6-79)
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Schedule B Continued

53.

EASEMENT AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED THEREIN:
Grantor:
SNYDERVILLE WEST
Grantee:
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
Location:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of the Grantors1
land at a point 502 feet North, more or less, from
the Southwest corner Section 31, Township 1 South,
Range 4 East, SLM, thence South 533 feet, more or
less, to a point on the Grantor's West boundary line
and being in Lot 4 of said Section 31, and Lot 4 of
Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, SLM.
Purpose:
To construct, operate, maintain and repair electric
transmission and/or distribution systen, under and
across the above.
Dated:,
March 3, 1981
Recorded:
April 16, 1981
Entry No:
178411
Book/Page:
M184/678
(affects Parcel 6)

54.

Subject to the affect of those certain easements and rights of way as set
out in Judgment on Stipulation, dated July 23, 1971, and recorded July 26,
1971, as Entry No. 113601, in Book M32, at page 269, Civil Case No. 4143.

55.

NOTICE OF EASEMENT RIGHTS:
Given by:
PARTNERSHIP INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, INC. &
PARK WEST WATER ASSOCIATION
Location:
Sections 35 and 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, and
Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, SLB&M.
Purpose:
Easement rights for Water Collection, Transmission and
Storeage in Willow Creek draw
Dated:
June 29, 1979
Recorded:
July 3, 1979
Entry No:
157302
Book/Page:
M136/348

56.

EASEMENT AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED THEREIN:
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC.
Grantor:
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH COMPANY
Grantee:
A 5 foot easement being 2.5 feet on each side of a buried
Location:
telephone cable over and across property located in
Section 35 and 36 of Township 1 Sout, Range 3 East, SLB&M.
Purpose:
To construct, operate, maintain and remove such communication and other facilities.
October 22, 1979
Dated:
December 26, 1979
Recorded:
162586
Entry No:
M148/714
Book/Page:

CONTINUED
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80.

ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACT FOR SECURITY PURPOSES
ASPEN GROVE INC.
Assignor:
LIFE RESOURCES INC.
Assignee:
$65,000.00
Amount:
November 29 1971
Dated:
December 1, 1971
Recorded:
114526
Entry No:
M34/570
Book/Page:
(Affects Parcel 4)

81.

DEED OF TRUST
Trustor:
KARL C. LeSUER
Trustee:
H . J . SAPERSTEIN
Beneficiary:
PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY
Amount:
$29,409.60 plus i n t e r e s t
Dated:
A p r i l 2 9 , 1976
Recorded:
J u n e 8 , 1976
Entry No:
131961
Book/Page:
M80/523
( A f f e c t s L o t 24 of P a r c e l 1)

82.

DEED OF TRUST
WAYLAND P. CALKINS & BARBARA CALKINS, husband and wife
Trustor:
Trustee:
McGHIE LAND TITLE COMPANY
Beneficiary:
AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES OF UTAH INC.
Amount:
$20,078.19 plus interest
Dated:
March 12, 1976
Recorded:
March 24, 1976
Entry No:
130999
Book/Page:
M78/274
(Affects Lot 23 of Parcel 1)

83.

Notice of Uniform Real Estate Contract dated July 31, 1978 and recorded
July 14, 1978, as Entry No. 147707, in Book M116, at page 363, of Official
Records, wherein Snyderville West claims an interest in Parcel 6 by virtue
of an Unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract.

84.

FINANCING STATEMENT
Debtor:
Creditor:
For:
Recorded:
Entry No:
Book/Page:

CONTINUED

JOHN CANEPARI
KERRY D. BODILY
All inventory, rolling stock, rails, engines, mechanical
parts and attendant mechanics of a ride known as "Skyrider"
October 1, 1981
184180
M199/717

1
2
3
4
5
6

ROBERT F . ORTON
T . RICHARD DAVIS
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST

I rn
h-

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR

1 9 1> P I

,; - -~<f

P *•*(?• v ri«:

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
T E L E P H O N E : (801) 5 2 1 - 3 8 0 0

7
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

8
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

9
10
11

STEVEN W. MAJOR, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR.,

12

Plaintiff,

13
14

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING

vs .
Civil No. 737.5

ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a
Utah Corporation; et al.,

15
Defendants

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SUMMIT

)

ss,

The undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
states:
1.

He is the Clerk of the District Court in and for Summit

County, State of Utah.
2.

The Summons, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

0300

"A" and by this reference incorporated herein, was received in the
office of the County Clerk of Summit County, State of Utah, on or
before the
3.

/£i&j\i,ik day of QofrQibor, 1983.

The Complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto as

Exhibit "B" and by this reference incorporated herein, was received
in the office of the County Clerk of Summit County, State of Utah,
Decernbex

on or before the
4.

fbU'* R-tk, days of Oe-boteer, 1983.

The undersigned mailed a true and correct copy of said

Summons to each of the Defendants listed below at their respective
addresses by addressing and dispatching a copy of said Summons and
a copy of said Complaint, postage prepaid:
•'(a)

Charles E. Hirsch, 1030 - 20th Street,

Santa Monica, California, 90403;
/

(b)

Harold D. Hirsch, 1030 - 20th Street,

Santa Monica, California, 90403;
'/(c)

Eugene H. Powert, c/o Alpine Ski Shop,

8808 South Sepulveda Boulevard, Westchester, California,
90045;
/(d)

Masahi Hashida, c/o Alpine Ski Shop, 8808

South Sepulveda Boulevard, Westchester, California, 90045;
/(e)

Snyderville West, 1253 East 7100 South, Salt

Lake City, Utah, 84106 (tax notice address) ;
^(f)

Park West Water Association, c/o Rinehart L.

0301
- 2

1

P,eshell, Agent, 606 Newhouse Building, Salt Lake

2

City, Utah, 84111;
(g)

3

Aspen Grove, Inc., c/o Richard S. Hallmark

4

or Savery L. Nash, 647 Camino De Los Mares, San Clemente,

5

California, 92672;
(h)

6
7

Colton, California, 92324;
(i)

8
9

12

Ensign Co., c/o Robert W. Ensign, 6931 Crest

Road, Palos Verdes Penin, California, 90274;
vj)

10
11

J. Robert West, 525 South Rancho Avenue,

Robert W. Ensign, 6931 Crest Road, Palos Verdes

Penin, California, 90274;
W W ^ ^

(k)

Park West Associates, c/o Walter J. Plumb,

13

III, 809 Edgehill Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah^or 57

14

West 200 South, #400, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101;
(1)

15
16

California;
(m)

17
18

John Muller, 8253 Van Nuys, Los Angeles,

Gerald W. Walters, 1235 Columbia Place,

Pasadena, California, 91101;

19 hm't. <uuk

(n)

Frostwood Limited, 3841 South Cove Point

20

Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah^or c/o Joseph A. Bond, Jr.,

21

241 North Vine, Midvale, Utah, 84047;

22
23
24

(o)

Ski Park City West, Inc., c/o Robert C.

Tucker, P. 0. Box 1476, Park City, Utah, 84060;
(p)

National Property Management, Inc., c/o

0302

Richard S. Hallmark or Savery L. Nash, 64 7 Camino
De Los Mares, San Clemente, California, 92672;
?^cuM*^>V

(q)

John Taylor Lott, rumored to live in Bloomington,

Utah; tax notices sent c/o Ike Koleman and Lester
Eddington, Box 9, Park City, Utah, 84060.
DATED this

/?#

day of £ ^ 2 ^ , 1983.
BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT:

C ^ | ^ jQx QshgyJL

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

/<?

day of

Qo^tobe^-, 1983,

h-y+fj/yJ\

NOTARY PUBLIC//
Residing at: £ ^,c
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

0303

Zi^r-s>t^WC
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OriiGlNAL
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *
%

BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, personal:
representative of the ESTATES
OF ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR.,
&.
deceased,

Sswwr*
%g^

'iaa&?

•^Jw a*

*-. rj?Q£

i kmm *Jr

Plaintiff
C i v i l No. 7325
vs.
Deposition of:
ENGLISH INN CO., INC. a
Utah corporation, et al.,

i*
T. RICHftRp DAVIS

>>

FILED

Defendants.
*

*

*

o * * ' .

T^ *
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BE IT REMEMBERED t h a t on t h e 8 t h day of J u n e , '
BY.

.ti&S1988, the deposition of T. RICHARD DAVIS, prodOtS&&wks a
witness herein at the instance of the Defendants in the
above-entitled action now pending in the above-named court,
was taken before SHIRLYN SHARPE, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public
in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of
9:00 a.m. of said day at 525 E. 100 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
* * *

*sst

^ MERIT ^

SHIRLYN SHARPE

^ REPORTERS O

(801) 322-3742

5 DAY DELIVERY

185South State Street • Suite 1020 • Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

1030

$•%*

(Examination by Mr. Wray)

A.

13

The last thing I did that I can recall was

consulting with Mr. Cahoon in the preparation of the tax
returns.

And I would guess that would have probably been in

the winter of *85-86.
Q.

Do you recall anything more specifically, before or

after Christmas?
A.

I can't remember.

Q.

Christmas, 1985?

A.

I can't remember whether it was before or after.

Q.

Did your involvement with this case continue all the

way through the entry of default judgment against the various
parties that were served by publication?
A.

It did.

Q.

What were your responsibilities with respect to the

matter of service of process on the named defendants and
service by publication when personal service was not able to
be effected?
A.

Well, I was responsible to make sure that all of the

named defendants were served.
Q.

Was it your sole responsibility or did you share that

responsibility with someone else?
A.

I guess it was my responsibility.

We consulted —

Bob and I consulted very frequently on this matter.

We used

Blake Miller, who was a brand new associate at the time, to
help us track down addresses and some of the investigation of

(Examination by Mr. Wray)
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who were these different people and entities. So, I can't say
it was my sole responsibility.
We also used the staff to do telephone searches and
the like, to try to gather information about these defendants.
Q.

Do you recall which of your staff members would have

been so involved?
A.

I know that a secretary named Edie Despain was

involved.
Q.

Was she your secretary?

A.

She was —

she did some work for me. She was

primarily Bob's secretary.
Q.

Bob Orton, you're referring to?

A.

Yes.

I believe we probably got some assistance from

Gail Zesiger.
Q.

How do you spell that, Z-E-S-I-G-E-R?
MR. ORTON:

A.

Z-I-Z-E-G-E-R.

I couldn't guess anymore. There may have been other

staff involved, but I don't —
Q.

Did you say she was a secretary, also?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Whose secretary was she?

A.

Primarily Milo Marsden's.

Q.

Is Edie Despain still with the firm?

A.

She is not.

Q.

When did she leave?

(Examination by Mr. Wray)
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dated 1978, and it is the same as Parcel 6 in the Complaint in
Civil No. 7325, as you have affirmed.
Can you tell me how that legal description set forth
in Parcel No. 6 happened to be attached to the Complaint?
A.

Yes, I can. We went up to — when I say "we,11 I'm

saying Blake Miller was sent to the Summit County Recorder's
Office and asked to search for any real properties which were
in the name of Robert Major, Joe Krofcheck, Investor
Associates, several other of the named defendants. Would you
like me to give you the rest of them?
Q.

Sure.

You said he was sent to the County Recorder's

Office?
A.

Yes.

Investor Associates, New York Investors, City

Development Corporation, Inc., Ski Park City West Inc., Park
City Utah Corporation, Major-Blakeny, Park City West
Association, Snyderville Land Company, English Inn Company,
Inc. and Inn Investors. We asked him to research any and get
descriptions of any of those parcels, any parcels in Summit
County in this Park West area which were titled in any of those
names.
Q.

If I understood you correctly, you did not name Jim

Gaddis or Snyderville West or Gaddis Investments or Gaddis
Associates?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And how was it that it was determined that he should

(Examination by Mr. Wray)
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search for those properties titled in those names?
A.

Those were corporations or entities which were owned ]Lj

or were alter egos of Robert Major.
Q.

How did you know that.

A.

By researching those documents in the twenty-two

boxes, or twenty-four or however many there were.
Q.

When did Mr. Blake Miller do that, go up to the

Summit County Recorder's Office?
A.

I don't know when he went up there.

Q.

You're referring to a document now, as you say that.

Is there any date or any indication from —
A.

It would have been prior to the filing of the

Complaint.
Q.

That's about all I can tell you.

But it was while you personally were working on the

case?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Was it you personally that went through the

twenty-two boxes and identified those names?
A.

I did go through each box.

Q.

So, you were the one that went through the boxes and

pulled out the names?
A.

I did.

I'm not the only person who looked through

those files. I think there were occasions where all of us went
through one file or another looking for certain documents, but
I personally went through each one of them.

(Examination by Mr. Wray)
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I have no recollection of how I got that.

I may have

gotten it through information from someone else or through — I
don't know, maybe it is listed there in the telephone book. I
don't know.
Q.

Mr. Davis, why don't you continue through that

Exhibit 18. At this point, on what would be the 6th page,
including the small little yellow —

or white note sheet in the

front, it commences with a document which appears to be
different from the previous document, at least in different
handwriting.
A.

Can you explain what that document is?

These are Blake Miller's notes. And I believe they

are from the County Recorder's Office or maybe from the
Assessor's Office up in Summit County.

Snyderville West is

listed on the second of those pages as No. 2, with the address
of 1253 East 2100 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84106, with a
little note to the side saying "Tax notices," and there is a
designation of a tax identification number of a certain parcel
of property.
Q.

What is that tax identification number?

A.

PP 102-B-10-11.

Q*

Do you know what parcel of property that pertains to?

A.

I do not.

Q.

For the record, I would represent to you that is not

the seven-acre parcel.
MR. ORTON:

It is not?

(Examination by Mr. Wray)
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I don't know.
Q.

Did you assume that an agent was necessary for

service on Snyderville West?

You mentioned you didn't have

the name of an agent.
A.

We didn't know what Snyderville West was.

Q.

But you don't recall whether or not you had an

address for Snyderville West at the time when that was
prepared?
A.

At the time of the preparation of this, I do not

recall.
Q.

Getting back to what Mr. Blake Miller was instructed

to do, if I remember your testimony earlier correctly — and
correct me if I don't remember it correctly —

I think you said

that the Marsden-Orton firm sent him up to the County
Recorder's office prior to the filing of the lawsuit to
determine what lands might have been in the names of those
various affiliated entities of Major?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And it was at that time, then, that he determined

that Snyderville West was listed in the County Recorder's
Office and they had a tax address?
A.

I don't think that was the time he determined that.

That was the time that we got the properties back and then we
got a title search ordered on those properties. After that, he
made several trips up to the Summit County offices to research

(Examination by Mr. Wray)
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who these people were and where they were. The first trip was
just to find what properties —

that was your question before,

how we decided what properties were to be involved.

That is

how we decided that.
Q.

Please excuse my lack of recollection of the

preciseness of your testimony earlier, but returning to
Deposition Exhibit 18, about the sixth page in where it
describes Snyderville West and gave that address.

Did I

understand your testimony, then, that you do not know when that
information was obtained?
A.

That,s correct.

Q.

And that you may not have had that information at the

time the lawsuit was filed; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

So, we really don't know how the legal description

for the lands was obtained or we have not established that by
your testimony?
A.

I think that's incorrect.

Q.

Okay, please clarify it.

A.

The legal description was decided by taking the names

of those entities which I gave you, of being owned or operated
by Robert Major, and running those through the Recorder's
Office or tax rolls or whatever rolls you could find up there,
to find out what properties were titled in those names. We
then brought those property descriptions and platted those out
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and brought those back down and researched those to see if,
indeed, those were owned by Major.

And if they were, then we

sent back to the title company asking them for a Title Report
to find whose names we should include on the Complaint.
Q.

Was it Blake Miller that went up there to do that

initial work?
A.

That's right.

Q.

And it was Blake Miller that did this, but they may

not have been at the same time?
A.

That's correct.
MR. ORTON:

By "this," you're referring to

Exhibit 18?
MR. WRAY:

Approximately page 6.

Thank you very

much, Bob.
Q.

You're not able to testify, based on your knowledge,

as to when this.— "this," again, being page 6 of Exhibit 18
that has Snyderville West —

was determined, along with the

address?
A.

I don't know when that was determined.

Apparently,

it was not early in the proceedings because, as we've looked
at several pages in this file, there were blanks next to
Snyderville West's name.
Q.

Mr. Davis, there are copies of correspondence and

legal documents remaining in this file folder, which file
folder, by the way, is identified as "Service By Publication-
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Major Estate 2109.1" on a white sticker on an eight and-a-half
by fourteen envelope with an orange strip on the top. That's
correct?
A.

It is.

Q.

Would you look through the remaining documents and

tell me if there are any documents that refer to Gaddis
Investments, Jim Gaddis or Snyderville West, please?
A.

There is a cover letter of October 14, 1983 to Summit

County Clerk asking the clerk to file the Motion for Permission
of Service of Summons by Publication, together with the
affidavit, and asks the court to sign the order; and
thereafter, directing her to mail the Summons to each of the
addresses.

I guess that indirectly concerns Snyderville West

because they were listed on this Motion for Permitting Service
of Summons by Publication.
2 of that motion.
the affidavit.

They are listed as Party E on page

They are also listed as Party E on page 2 of

That is my affidavit in support of the motion.

The affidavit is also dated October 14, 1983. Snyderville West
is listed as having a tax notice address of 1253 East 2100
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84106.
Q.

Stopping for a moment at that document, that document

is dated October 14, 1983 and signed by you; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Based on reviewing that document in the context of

the time in which it was executed, do you have a recollection
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now as to when and under what circumstances the address for
Snyderville West became known, apart from what you've already
testified?
A.

Sometime between May of x83 and October of *83.

Q.

As far as the circumstances, does this refresh your

recollection at all?
A.

The same answer I gave you before.

I think Blake

Miller discovered something in the name of Snyderville West on
the tax records of Snyderville —

or of Summit County.

You

told us today that it was on a different parcel of property,
but he did find that name up there.
I find Snyderville West is also listed in the Order
Authorizing Directing Service by Publication on page 2,
Defendant E, with the same tax notice address.

That order

appears it was executed on December 6, 1983 by Judge Hansen.

A

copy of the Summons which lists Snyderville West as
Defendant E.

The Summons, I believe, was the one directed to

be published, including, I guess, that Parcel 6, the property
you were speaking about earlier in this deposition.
Q.

That being the seven-acre parcel that we spoke about?

A.

I guess that's what it is.

There is an Affidavit of

Mailing or a copy of that affidavit.

This is an unsigned copy

and it includes Snyderville West as E, Defendant E.

And there

is a typographical error in that notice that the tax notice
address, instead of saying 2100 South, says 7100 South.

The
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Snyderville West until the past week or so.
If I might also add to that testimony, I reviewed the
names of the parties that we didn't know who they were with
Mr. Don Strong, who is counsel for many of the defendants, and
asked him if he knew who any of these were, and he did not.
Snyderville West was one of those on that list, and he was not
familiar with it.
Q.

When would that have taken place?

A.

Sometime before the publication.

Sometime in the

summer of 1983.
Q.

When you say the publication, you mean the

publication of service?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

I believe you testified earlier that Don Strong

let me correct that.

—

I'm not sure if you did testify earlier,

but Don Strong, in fact, was not listed in this case as
representing Snyderville West; is that correct?
A.

That's correct.

What I just testified to aoyidag. is

that, after he entered his Answer on behalf of many of the
defendants, I asked him if he knew of the other defendants
whose entity and identification we did not know.
Q.

And Don Strong replied negatively?

A.

This was not one of the defendants that he had any

knowledge of.
Q.

Do you have any separate record of that
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on this document?
A.

I don't see it.

Q.

In fact, is the name of Snyderville West identified

anywhere in the four pages of this Summons with attached
service memoranda?
A.

I believe it is.

Q.

Except as listed

A.

They are listed as one of the defendants.

Q.

—

as one of the defendants?

MR. ORTON:
A.

—

On the first page.

Except as listed as one of the defendants on

approximately line 20, I don't see that it is.
directed to the above-named defendants.
reference to anybody up in there.

The Summons is

I guess that is a

But outside of that, there

is no specific mention of Snyderville West.
Q.

Okay.

And I believe, as you testified earlier, the

typed notation on the top is: "Please serve upon Jim Gaddis"?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And there is no mention of Snyderville West there?

A.

Not on the top, that's correct.

Q.

Please continue.

A.

I don't know if you have that from before.

from the client.

That is

He better review that before you look at it.

MR. ORTON:
MR. WRAY:

That would be privileged.
For the record, I would like to note that

(Examination by Mr. Wray)

54

through today, that's where I get my knowledge.
Q,

Are you able to specifically remember an envelope

addressed to Snyderville West?
A.

No, I do not.

Q.

Are you able to state that an envelope, assuming it

were mailed to Snyderville West, was never returned to the
Marsden-Orton law firm?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

And what's the basis for that?

A.

That we maintain the file with all of them that came

back and it is not among them.
Q.

But you're not able to state definitely that such an

envelope was never returned?
MR. ORTON:
yes.

I'll object, I think he could state,

I think he did state that.
Q.

I recognize it is a difficult area of response

because you're asked to state to a negative.
A.

Let me state it this way.

I can state that all of

those envelopes which were returned when I was in the employ of
Marsden, Orton & Liljenquist were maintained in this file, and
none that were returned when I was there were removed from this
file.
Q.

But you have not had control over this file since you

A.

I have not had control over this file since I left

left?
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and I am not aware of any that have been taken out of this file
since I left.
Q.

But clearly, there wouldn't be any reason for you to

know one way or the other, since you are not with the law firm?
A.

That's correct. Anything that happened to this file

between then and now, I do not have knowledge of,
Q.

What areas of law do you specialize in or

particularly practice in?
A,

Real estate.

Q.

Any other areas?

A.

Oh, I do some commercial litigation, but basically

real estate.
Q.

Have you participated in any other lawsuits

attempting to quiet title?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Had you done so prior to your involvement with this

lawsuit or at the same time, continuing, recognizing this
lawsuit continued over several years with your involvement?
A.

I'm not sure we had a quiet title action going at

that time.
Q,

I can't recall one.

Do you recall if you participated in any quiet title

actions or actions similar to quiet title in which title to
land was at issue, prior to being involved with this lawsuit?
A.

Before this lawsuit?

Q.

That's correct.
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investigation.
A.

We called the Department of Motor Vehicles and asked

for anything in the name of Snyderville West and nothing was
found.

I believe Blake Miller was the one who did the actual

calling on that.

I could be mistaken, but that's what I

believe.
Q.

Subparagraph C states, in effect, that you found

only the tax address?
A.

That's correct.

I did call the Department of

Business Corporations here in the state.

I also called the

County Clerk's Office here and in Summit County seeking a
limited partnership in the name of Snyderville West, and none
was found.

I see the corporate information is set forth on D.

Q.

In what records did you find the tax address?

A.

I didn't find it. Mr. Miller found it.

I believe

it was in the Assessor's Office.
Q.

As to when, your best recollection, as I recall, was

sometime between May of 1983 and October of 1983?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he make inquiry of the Treasurer's Office?

A.

I don't know.

Q.

How about the Recorder's Office?

A.

I'm sure he did the Recorder's Office.

I don't know

if he did the Treasurer's Office.
Q.

You said a minute ago, you think it was the
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Assessor's Office where he got that address?
Yes.
Q.

Why is it that you say you know that he talked to

the Recorder's Office?
A.

Because he went up to the Recorder's Office at first

to find out where the plats of land are; and then when we were
looking for properties, he went back to the Recorder's Office
to find out if they had any addresses which correlated to those
properties on which we found names.
Q.

When he first went up to the Recorder's Office, would

that have been prior to June of 1982?

The reason why I pull

June of 1982 out of the year as a date is that I notice that a
Title Report, which we'll get to a little later, had <in
effective date of June of 1982 and a listing of all of the
property on Parcel No. 6 which is the seven-acre Snyderville
West property.
A.

He may have.

My guess is he did.

I'm —

I assume we

could go back and find his time sheets and find that out.
Q.

Did you, at any time, yourself, personally visit the

Recorder's Office and the Treasurer's Office or the Assessor's
Office in Summit County in respect to this case?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Can you tell me when and under what circumstances?

A.

I reviewed the file to see what they had received as

far as Answers and Returns of Service after the Complaint had
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been filed, and I don't know what date it would have been.
was probably

It

—

Q.

That would have been the Clerk's Office?

A.

The Clerk's Office.

Oh, you did not include the

Clerk?
Q.

I guess I included the Recorder's, Treasurer's and

Assessor's Office.
A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

You never went to the Recorder's, Treasurer's Office

or the Assessor's Office?
A.

In Summit County, that's correct.
MR. ORTON:
MR. WRAY:

Q.

He, personally, you're talking about?
That's correct.

Is there anything more you can add, based on whatever

refreshing of recollection you have had through all this, as to
the circumstances under which the tax address had been
determined, the 1253 East 2100 South?
A.

I believe it was just from the records of Summit

County.
Q.

And you have no separate recollection as to the

specific property to which that address related?
A.

No, I do not.

Q.

Subparagraph D

A.

I already stated

Q.

—

—
—

relates to investigation of corporation files?
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Yes, I called both the corporate offices, in both

Salt Lake and Summit County, to see if there were —

seeking

information as to registered assumed names, and none were
listed.
Q.

Subparagraph E?

A.

Postal service check.

I asked the secretary to see

if there were forwarding addresses on all of the names, many
of whom we had no address for, to see if they had a listing
for any of them.
Q.

Did you believe, at the time between May of 1983 and

October of 1983, that Snyderville West owned property in Summit
County by virtue of your knowledge that there was a tax
address?
A.
anything.

I made no such opinion as to whether they owned
I certainly knew that they claimed an interest in

certain property that was involved in our litigation.
Q.

And the basis for your knowledge of that claim,

again, was what?
A.

The Title Report.
MR. WRAY:

Let me turn to a copy of the Title Report

which I'd like to introduce as Exhibit No. 23.
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 2 3 was
marked for identification.)
Q.

This is a document, the original of which Mr. Orton

has provided at this meeting for copying.

It is identified as
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a Title Report of Utah Title and Abstract Company, actually
identified as a Commitment for Title Insurance, addressed to
Mr. Robert Orton.

I ask, Mr. Davis, if you would take a look

at that and describe that document for me more fully and
identify it.

Is that the Title Report that you referred to a

minute or two ago?
A.

I don't have an independent recollection if this is

the only one or one we used.

It appears to be a title

commitment that was sent to Mr. Orton in June of 1982, so it
stands to reason this is certainly one that we looked at.
Q.

Do you recall ever looking at one such Title Report?

A.

I don't know.
MR. WRAY:

I can't recall.

Bob, do you recall if there was another

Title Report that was prepared at or about that time or in
connection with the lawsuit?
MR. ORTON:
prepared.

I don't think we had another one

Whether we had access to others from the files, I

don't know.
MR. WRAY:
this one.

In any event, you obviously had access to

It was addressed to you.

Q.

What is the effective date of that title commitment?

A.

June 10, 1982.

Q.

It is order No.

A.

—

Q.

Would you turn to Exhibit B.

—

S-5383.
That contains a listing
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of parcels?
A.

It does.

Q.

Would you take a minute to look at that and tell me

if that is the same listing of parcels as was set forth in the
Complaint which was attached to Exhibit No. 17?
A.

Nine of the parcels that are listed on this report

are also listed in the Complaint.

There are also two other

parcels on the Complaint.
Q.

Can you tell me where the legal descriptions for

parcels No. 10 and 11 on the Complaint would have come from,
then, since they clearly didn't come from the Title Report?
A.

Other documents which we had found in the search of

the files of Mr. Major.
Q.

Do you have with you or have you seen today, in the

files that Mr. Orton provided, copies of those documents that
were provided with reference to that?
A.

I have not seen those today.

Q.

Do you know what those documents are?

A.

Off the top of my head, no.
But as to parcels Nos. 1 through 9 of the Summons

—

Deposition Exhibit 17, and also in the Complaint, are the legal
descriptions the same as in the Title Report?
A.

They appear to be the same.

I have not reviewed

every call and boundary to make sure that they were exactly the
same, but they appear to be the same.
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Q.

How about Parcel No* 6 in particular?

A.

It appears to be the same as Parcel No. 6 in the

Title Report.
Q.

You want to take a minute and just confirm that,

since it is just a paragraph long?
A.

Okay.
(Discussion off the record)
MR. WRAY:

Q.

On the record.

Is the legal description of Parcel 6 in the Title

Report which I will, for shorthand reference, probably continue
to use as a reference to deposition Exhibit 23, and Parcel
No. 6 of the Summons and Complaint attached as part of
deposition Exhibit 17 the same?
A.

It is.

Q.

Has your review so far of this Title Report,

Deposition Exhibit 23, in light of the fact that the effective
date of June 10, 1982 is indicated on that document, refreshed
your recollection in any way as to specific details of how the
legal descriptions of the various parcels were determined,
other than what you previously testified?

Any specific times

as to when Mr. Miller —
A.

Mr. Miller?

Q.

Yes.

A.

I guess it would have been prior to June 10, 1982.

Q.

It is still your best recollection that the source of
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those legal descriptions and those individual parcels would
have been Mr. Miller 's investigation in the Recorder's Office?
A.

Those together with what other documents we found in

the files of Mr. Major.
Q.

Would you take a minute and leaf through or go

through Exhibit A to the Title Report, Deposition Exhibit
No. 23, Exhibit A being described as "The title of the estate
referred to vested in, see Exhibit A," with respect to seeing
if the Title Report identifies vesting with respect to Parcel
No. 6?
A.

Maybe I'm missing it, but I don't see it.

Do you?

Q.

I didn't see it, either.

A.

Krofcheck remaining, so I guess it does say that

J. L. Krofcheck, a/k/a Joseph L. Krofcheck was vested in the
property remaining in Parcel No. 6.
Q.

Would you take a minute and review Schedule B,

Section 2, which is identified in the printed part of the form
as the "Special Exceptions," it is entitled, to determine if
there is any reference to Snyderville West, Jim Gaddis or
Gaddis Investments?
MR. ORTON:

You mean any exception to Joseph

Krofcheck?
MR. WRAY:
A.

Any reference in Schedule B 2

That specified any exception to Gaddis or

Snyderville West?

—
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Q.

That's correct.

A.

No* 53, which is "Easement and Conditions Contained

Therein" shows the grantor to be Snyderville West of that
easement dated March 23, 1981, recorded April 16, 1981.
Q.

What parcel does that effect?

A.

It effects Parcel 6.

Q.

Did you examine that document to determine if there

was any further information concerning the address of
Snyderville West?
A.

I can't recall whether I personally examined that

document or not.
Q.

Do you know if anyone in the Marsden-Orton office

examined that document?
A.

Well, if I can't remember whether I did or not, I

would have a hard time telling you that somebody else did.

We

reviewed the documents that were designated here, someone did,
to try to find who and what was the entity of Snyderville
West.

But I have no independent recollection of that document.
Q.

So, you have no recollection, yourself, of examining

that document?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

You don't know if anybody in the Marsden-Orton firm

examined that document?
A.

I couldn't tell you who did.

Q.

Or indeed, if anyone did?
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A.

I could not state that someone did.

That's correct.

Q.

Please continue.

A.

No. 83 is a "Notice of Uniform Real Estate Contract

dated July 13, 1978 and recorded July 14, 1978 wherein
Snyderville West claims an interest in Parcel 6 by an
Unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract."
Q.

Did you examine —

did you, yourself, examine that

Notice of Uniform Real Estate Contract?
A.

I do not have an independent recollection of

examining that document.
Q.

Would you have made a notation in the files if you

had done so?
A.

I don't know.

I may have.

Q.

Would you ordinarily have, in your search for the

identity of Snyderville West?
A.

If I had found something that had given me a notice

of or something that might have helped me to find who and what
Snyderville West was, then I would have made a notation.
Q.

I draw your attention to the Gaddis Deposition

Exhibit 5 which is entitled a Notice of Uniform Real Estate
Contract and is recorded, and the document and Deposition
Exhibit 5 states it is entry 147707, which is the same number
as given in paragraph 83 of the Title Report; is that correct?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And the book and page numbers are the same in the
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reference in paragraph 83 and in the document, Deposition
Exhibit 5?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Do you recall having seen that document, that being

Deposition Exhibit 5?
A.

I don't have an independent recollection of it, but

it wouldn't surprise me if I had seen it.
Q.

Why do you say that?

A.

Because there were many documents which were signed

by Robert Major in the files of Investor Associates that I did
review and look at.
Q.

Was that document signed by Robert Major?

A.

It was.

Q.

But you have no separate and definite remembrance of

ever having seen that document before?
A.

I don't have independent recollection of this

document, that's correct.
Q.

You have no records that you have produced today or

you are aware of that would indicate you have ever seen that
document?
A.

No, I would have to go back and look in the Investor

Associates file to see if a copy of that is in that file.
—

If I

as I look at this, I don't know I would make any notation

because it gives no clue as to who Snyderville West is.
Q.

What is the Investor Associates file?
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As to attorney Don Strong, did you make any such

inquiry?
Q.

I specifically remember speaking with Don Strong

about each of these defendants and the problem we were having
serving them.
Q.

Your testimony was that he had no knowledge of

Snyderville West?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

Did you, in fact, prepare a Summons for personal

service for Snyderville West in this case?
A.

Number one, when you say did I, in fact, prepare it,

I assume you mean did I cause it to be prepared by my
secretaries.

I didn't type out any of the Summonses.

Q.

Did you cause to be?

A.

I'm not sure whether we did for them or not.

Q.

You don't recall?

A.

I don't recall.

Q.

Why would that have been the case, that you might not

have?
A.

If we didn't know who to serve, then we may not have

caused a personal service or personal —

or a Complaint

specifically designated to Snyderville West would have been
prepared.
Q.

Who, in the office of —

A.

Let me make one backtrack on that.

In connection
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"... caused to be prepared envelopes addressed to the
defendants..." identified in that Affidavit of Mailing; is that
correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

An important issue in this case, for the purpose of

present proceedings, may be the address on the envelope.

Is it

possible for you to state what address was on that envelope at
that time when the envelope addressed to Snyderville West was
sent out?
A.

I don't have an independent recollection of what

address was on the envelope.
MR. ORTON:

Are you asking him from his own personal

recollection, or based upon office procedures at the time?
MR. WRAY:
A.

Personal recollection.

I do not have a personal recollection of what was on

that envelope.
Q.

Do you know if a photocopy or a xerographic copy was

kept of the face of the envelope to Snyderville West?
A.

I'm certain that one was not.

Q.

That's just because that's not the procedure,

correct?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

You state in your affidavit that the address which

was typed on the envelope was taken from the record referred to
in paragraph 6 of your affidavit, which shows the address to be
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But is it not true that, even though it

may generally have been the contemplation of all the parties
that it be the correct address, that it might, in fact, have
been typed on the envelope as 7100 South instead of 2100
South?
MR. ORTON:

I object.

It calls for speculation on

the part of the witness.
Q.

Are you able to state with a certainty that the

envelope, as mailed, had the address of 2100 South rather than
7100 South?
A.

I cannot state that.

Q.

With respect to your affidavit, paragraph 10, you

state in here that the first class postage for the envelopes
delivered to the Summit County Clerk, that the postage was
affixed to the envelopes when they were delivered for mailing
to the Summit County Clerk.

But earlier, we've seen that, in

fact, there was a Coalville postmark on there.

And I believe

your testimony was that, in fact, it was probably the County
Clerk's Office that affixed the postage?
A.

My testimony was, we probably put the Martin Luther

stamp on and the excess postage was affixed by the Summit
County Clerk.
Q.

Your statement in paragraph 10 of the affidavit is

not strictly correct in the sense that all of the necessary
postage was not put on the envelopes when you delivered the
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You can't state

with a certainty, based our own personal experience or records
available to you, that it was mailed out with the correct
postage?
A.

Based on the records that are available to me, I

would have to state that there was a Martin Luther twenty-cent
stamp in the corner and there was another postage seal from
Coalville, Utah for any remaining postage which may have been
due on that.
Q.

What we have seen have been the postage stamps

affixed on the envelopes that were ultimately returned to you.
But since we never got back and no one ever located the
envelope addressed to Snyderville West, we have no information
on that?
A.

That's correct. We haven't got it back and we don't

have it before us. That's correct.
Q.

I'd like to have you take a look at several of the

documents in the deposition exhibits and see if you can tell me
if you have ever seen these documents before.

Gaddis

deposition document No. 2 is a document entitled Memorandum
Agreement for the Sale and Purchase of Real Property. Would
you look at that document and tell me if you've ever seen that
document?
A.

I don't have a recollection of this document.

have seen it, but I don't know.

I may
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Rule 4. Process.
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to have issued when
placed in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of service. Separate
summonses may be issued and served.
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon within three months from the
date of such filing. The summons must be served within one year after the
filing of the complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed, provided that in
any action brought against two or more defendants in which personal service
has been obtained upon one of them within the year, the other or others may
be served or appear at any time before trial.
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the
court, the names or designations of the parties to the action, the county in
which it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state the time within which
the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify
him that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered
against him. If the summons be served without a copy of the complaint, or by
publication, it shall briefly state the sum of money or other relief demanded,
and in case of publication of summons such summons as published shall contain a description of the subject matter or res involved in the action. Where
the summons is served without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy of
said complaint will be served upon or mailed to defendant within ten days
after such service or that if the address of defendant is unknown, the complaint will be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after such
service.
(d) By whom served. The summons, and a copy of the complaint, if any,
may be served:
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the county where the service is
made, or by his deputy, or by any other person over the age of 21 years,
and not a party to the action; provided, that this rule shall not abrogate
the provisions of chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1945.
(2) In another state or United States territory by the sheriff of the
county where the service is made, or by his deputy, or by a United States
marshal or his deputy.
(3) In a foreign country, either:
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country; or
(B) upon an individual, by delivery to him personally, and upon a
corporation or partnership or association, by delivery to an officer, a
managing or general agent; or
(C) by any form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the party to be served; or
(D) as directed by order of the court.
Service under (B) or (D) above may be made by any person who is not a
party and is not less than 21 years of age or who is designated by order of
the court.
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service within the state shall be as
follows:
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 years or over, by delivering a
copy thereof to him personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual place
6
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of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing; or.
by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process.
(2) Upon a natural person under the age of 14 years, by delivering a
copy thereof to such person and also to his father, mother or guardian; or,
if none can be found within the state, then to any person having the care
and control of such minor, or with whom he resides, or in whose service he
is employed.
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to be of unsound mind or
incapable of conducting his own affairs, by delivering a copy thereof to his
legal guardian.
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise provided for, upon a
partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit
under a common name, by delivering a copy thereof to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment
or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized
by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a
copy to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found in the
county in which the action is brought, then upon any such officer or
agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent
having the management, direction or control of any property of such
corporation, partnership or other unincorporated association within the
state. If no such officer or agent can be found in the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of
business in this state, or does business in this state, then upon the person
doing such business or in charge of such office or place of business.
(5) Upon an incorporated city, by delivering a copy thereof to the
mayor or recorder; upon an incorporated town, by delivering a copy
thereof to the president or clerk of the board of trustees.
(6) Upon a county, by delivering a copy thereof to a county commissioner or to the county clerk of such county.
(7) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy
thereof to the president or clerk of the board.
(8) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy to the
president or secretary of its board.
(9) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be
brought against the state, by delivering a copy thereof to the attorney
general.
(10) Upon a natural person, nonresident of the state of Utah, doing
business in this state at one or more places of business, as set forth in
Rule 17(e), by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to
one of his managers, superintendents or agents.
(11) Upon a department or agency of this state, or upon any public
board, commission or body, subject to suit, by delivering a copy thereof to
any member of its governing board, or to its executive employee or secretary.
(12) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the State or any of its political subdivisions, by delivering a copy
to the person who has the care, custody or control of the individual to be
served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of
7
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the individual to be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any
case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served.
(0 Other service.
(1) Service by publication. Where the person upon whom service is
sought resides outside of the state, or has departed from the state, or
cannot after due diligence be found within the state, or conceals himself
to avoid the service of process, or where such party is a corporation having no officer or other agent upon whom process can be served within this
state, or where in an action in rem some or all of the defendants are
unknown, service of process may be made by publication, as follows:
The party desiring service of process by publication shall file a motion
verified by the oath of such party or of someone in his behalf for an order
of publication. It shall state the facts authorizing such service and shall
show the efforts that have been made to obtain personal service within
this state, and shall give the address, or last known address, of each
person to be served or shall state that the same is unknown. The court
shall hear the motion ex parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been
used to obtain personal service within this state, or that efforts to obtain
the same would have been of no avail, shall order publication of the
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in
which the action is pending. Such publication shall be made at least once
a week for four successive weeks. Within ten days after the order is
entered, the clerk shall mail a copy of the summons and'complaint to each
person whose address has been stated in the motion. Service shall be
complete on the day of the last publication.
(2) Alternative to service by publication. In circumstances described in (1) above justifying service of summons by publication, if the
party desiring service of summons shall file a verified petition stating the
facts from which the court determines that service by mail is just as likely
to give actual notice as service by publication, the court may order that
service of summons shall be given by the clerk mailing a copy of the
summons and complaint to the party to be served at his address, or his
last known address. Service shall be complete ten days after such mailing.
(3) Service outside of state. Personal service of a copy of the summons and complaint outside of this state is equivalent to service by publication and deposit in the post office, and shall be complete on the day of
such service.
(g) Manner of proof. Within five days after service of process, proof
thereof shall be made as follows:
(1) if served by a sheriff or United States marshal, or a deputy of either, by his certificate with a statement as to the date, place, and manner
of service.
(2) if by any other person, by his affidavit thereof, with the same statement.
(3) if by publication by the affidavit of the publisher or printer or his
foreman or principal clerk, showing the same and specifying the date of
the first and last publication; and an affidavit by the clerk of the court of
a deposit of a copy of the summons and complaint in the post office as
prescribed by Subdivision (f) of this rule, if such deposit shall have been
made.
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(4) by the written admission or waiver of service by the person to be
served, duly acknowledged, or otherwise proved.
(h) Amendment At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be
amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the
substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.
(i) Refusal of copy. If the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of
the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same shall
state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof.
0") Time of service to be endorsed on copy. At the time of service, the
person making such service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons left
for the person being served, the date upon which the same was served, and
shall sign his name thereto, and, if an officer, add his official title.
(k) Designation of newspaper for publication of notice. In any proceeding where summons or other notice is required to be published, the court
shall, upon the request of the party applying for such publication, designate
the newspaper and authorize and direct that such publication shall be made
therein; provided, that the newspaper selected shall be a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and
shall be published in the English language.
(1) Service of process by telegraph or telephone. A summons, writ,
order or other process in any civil action or proceeding, and all other papers
requiring service, may be transmitted by telegraph or telephone for service in
any place within this state, and the telegraphic or telephonic copy of such
process or paper so transmitted may be served or executed by the officer or
other person to whom it is sent for that purpose, and returned by him, if
return is required, in the same manner and with the same force and effect as
the original thereof; and the officer or person serving or executing the same
has the same authority, and is subject to the same liabilities as if the copy
were the original. The process or paper, when a writ or order, must be filed in
the court from which it was issued, and a certified copy thereof must be
preserved in the telegraph or telephone office from which it was sent. The
operator sending the message may use either the original or a certified copy of
the process or paper. Whenever any document to be sent by telegraph or
telephone bears a seal, either private or official, it is not necessary for the
operator in sending the same to telegraph or telephone a description of the
seal, or any word or device thereon, but the same may be expressed in the
telegraphic or telephonic copy by the letters "L.S.," or by the word "Seal."
(m) Service by constable. All writs and process, including executions
upon judgments, issued out of a district, city or justice court in a civil action or
proceeding may be served by any constable of the county.
(Amended, effective March 1, 1988.)
ing to §§ 10-2-110 and ft-3-106, the governing
body of an incorporated town consists of a
council and mayor.
Cross-References. — Collection agencies,
process server in actions by, § 12-1-8.
Condominium association or ownership, service of process on person designated in declaration, § 57-8-33.
Constable, service of process by, §§ 17-22-25,
17-25-1.

Amendment Note9. — The 1988 amendment added Subdivision (e)(12).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule generally
follows Rule 4, F.R.C.P.
Laws 1945, ch. 28, referred to in Subdivision
(d)(1), appears as § 12-1-8, relating to actions
by collection agencies.
The reference, in Subdivision (e)(5), to the
"president or clerk of the board of trustees" of
an incorporated town seems incorrect. Accord-
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nonresident infant defendant shall have 20 days after his appointment in
which to plead to the action.
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding.
(d) Associates may be sued by common name. When two or more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership
or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they
may be sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the
defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the
same manner as if all had been named defendants and had been sued upon
their joint liability.
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of
Utah in one or more places in his own name or a common trade name, and
said business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superintendent, or agent, said person may be sued in his own name in any action arising
out of the conduct of said business.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 17, F.R.C.R

Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5101 et seq.
Service of process, Rule 4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Associates.
—Joint venture.
—Partnership.
—Unincorporated association.
Infants.
—Action for injury of minor.
Suit by mother.
—Control by court.
—Failure to comply.
Relief from judgment.
Nonresident doing business in state.
—Not found.
Real party in interest.
—Assignee.
—Corporation.
Assignment of assets to another corporation.
Foreign corporation.
Shareholder.
—Insurance company.
—Joint tort-feasors.
—Partner in joint venture.
—Purpose of rule.
—Wife.
Cited.

joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 95
Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (1988).
—Partnership.
Subdivision (d) does not affirmatively allow
a partnership to bring suit in its common
name, but the absence of a provision specifically authorizing a lawsuit in the partnership
name is not indicative of an intent to prohibit
such a suit. Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil
Prods., 114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987).
—Unincorporated association.
Subdivision (d) does not authorize an unincorporated association to institute an action in
its common name. Disabled Am. Veterans v.
Hendrixson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P.2d 416
(1959).
Infants.
—Action for injury of minor.
Suit by mother.
Under this rule, mother as guardian ad litem
for benefit of father could bring action for injuries to sixteen-year-old son where father, an
immigrant, had a somewhat limited use of English and business matters were mainly handled by the mother; § 78-11-6 providing for
suit by father was not exclusive remedy.
Skoliingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484
P.2d 1177 (1971).

Associates.
—Joint venture.
Joint venturers may sue in the name of the
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fcule 10. Form of p l e a d i n g s .
f (a) Caption; n a m e s of parties. Every pleading
lhail contain a caption setting forth the name of the
jourt, the title of the action, the file number, and a
lesignation as in Rule 7(a). In the complaint the title
jf the action shall include the names of all the paries, but in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the
lame of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties. A party whose name is
iot known shall be designated by any name and the
irords "whose true name is unknown." In an action in
rem unknown parties shall be designated as "all unblown persons who claim any interest in the subjectnatter of this action.'*
&{b) P a r a g r a p h s ; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense shall be made in numbered
paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single
set of circumstances; and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. Each
jlaim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each defense other than denials shall be
stated in a separate count or defense whenever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth.
fac(c) A d o p t i o n by reference; exhibits. Statements
in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading,
Mr in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part
thereof for all purposes.
ft (d) P a p e r u s e d for pleadings; size and style. All
pleadings and other papers filed in any action, except
printed documents or other similar exhibits, shall be
typewritten on good, white, unglazed paper of letter
Bize (8V2" x 11"), with a margin at the top of each page
bf not less than 2 inches and a left hand margin of not
less than 1 inch. The impression must be on one side
of the paper only and must be double spaced, except
for matter customarily single spaced and indented.
[The number of the action shall be inserted on the first
page of every pleading or other paper filed, and the
matter appearing on all pleadings or other papers
Shall be clearly legible.
$ The clerk of the court shall examine all pleadings
and" other papers filed and may require counsel to
Substitute for any pleadings or other papers not conforming to the foregoing requirements, original
pleadings or other papers prepared in conformity
frtith this subdivision.
W (e) Replacing lost p l e a d i n g s or papers. If an
Jnginal pleading or paper filed in any action or proseeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or
yithout notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed
tod used in lieu of the original.
tvAmended, effective Jan. 1, 1983.)
n* *
*ule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and
*&iv
other papers; sanctions.
>Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party
"presented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
* attorney of record in his individual name who is
ftiy licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The
Attorney's address also shall be stated. A party who is
S 6 * represented by an attorney shall sign his pleadW » motion, or other paper and state his address. Exij*Pt when otherwise specifically provided by rule or
ij^-jrte, pleadings need not be verified or accompa;*W b y affidavit. The rule in equity that the averr{??&t3 °f an answer under oath must be overcome by
rff? testimony of two witnesses or of one witness susw 1 1 ^ by corroborating circumstances
circumstanc is abolished.

iffW,

Rule 12

certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Rule 12. D e f e n s e s and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his
answer within 20 days after the service of the summons is complete unless otherwise expressly provided
by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve
an answer thereto within 20 days afler the service
upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a
counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the
court, within 20 days afler service of the order, unless
the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion
under this rule alters these periods of time as follows,
unless a different time is fixed by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones
its disposition until the trial on the merits, the
responsive pleading shall be served within 10
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be
served within 10 days after the service of the
more definite statement.
(b) H o w presented. Every defense, in law or fact,
to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required, except that the following defenses may at
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable
party. A motion making any of these defenses shall
be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections
in a responsive pleading or motion or by further
pleading afler the denial of such motion or objection.
If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in
law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and

Rule 13

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After
the pleadings are closed but within such time as not
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment
on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1) — (7) in Subdivision (b) of this
rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and
the motion for judgment mentioned in Subdivision (c)
of this rule shall be heard and determined before trial
on application of any party, unless the court orders
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a
pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted
is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he
may move for a more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details
desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the
court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the
order or within such other time as the court may fix,
the court may strike the pleading to which the motion
was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party
before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within 20 days after the service of
the pleading upon him, the court may order stricken
from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who
makes a motion under this rule may join with it the
other motions herein provided for and then available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and
does not include therein all defenses and objections
then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so
omitted, except as provided in Subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either
by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made
no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a
legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits,
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at
the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule
15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been
received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing
of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
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party who prevailed on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in
the event the appellate court concludes that the trial
court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it
from determining that the respondent is entitled to a
new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a new tnal shall be granted
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time
as the court reasonably directs, any party may file
written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in said requests The court shall
inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions,
unless the parties stipulate that such instructions
may be given orally or otherwise waive this requirement If the instructions are to be given in writing,
all objections thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury, otherwise, objections
may be made to the instructions after they are given
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its
verdict No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a
party must state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice,
may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction Opportunity shall be given to make objections,
and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made
after the court has instructed the jury The court
shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if
the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct
the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact
(Amended, effective Jan 1, 1987 )
Rule 52. Findings by the c o u r t
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A, in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings
on motions, except as provided m Rule 4Kb) The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground
(b) A m e n d m e n t Upon motion of a party made not
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court
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may amend its findings or make additional findings
and may amend the judgment accordingly The mo
tion may be made with a motion for a new trial pur
suant to Rule 59 When findings of fact are made in
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find
ings may thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made either
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment or a
motion for a new trial
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties
to an issue of fact
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the
trial,
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in
the minutes
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987)
Rule 53. Masters.
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all
of the issues in an action may be referred by the court
to a master upon the written consent of the parties, or
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accor
dance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this
rule As used in these rules the word "master in
eludes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner The
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the
parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the
action, which is in the custody and control of the
court as the court may direct The master shall not
retain his report as security for his compensation but
when the party ordered to pay the compensation al
lowed by the court does not pay it after notice and
within the time prescribed by the court, the master is
entitled to a writ of execution against the delinquent
party
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the
exception and not the rule In actions to be tried by i
jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues
are complicated, in actions to be tried without a jury
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in the
absence of the written consent of the parties, be made
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition
requires it
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform
particular acts or to receive and report evidence onlv
and may fix the time and place for beginning and
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master s
report Subject to the specifications and limitations
stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hear
ing before him and to do all acts and take all mea
sures necessary or proper for the efficient perfor
mance of his duties under the order He may require
the production before him of evidence upon all mat
ters embraced in the reference, including the produc
tion of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, an
writings applicable thereto He may rule upon the
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by
the order of reference and has the authority to Pu
witnesses on oath and may himself examine the
and may call the parties to the action and examw
them upon oath When a party so requests, the mas
ter shall make a record of the evidence offered an
excluded in the same manner and subject to the sam
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ldgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon
he docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the
xtent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to
e a hen In case of partial satisfaction, if any executon shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such
xecution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of
uch partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to
:>llect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from
le judgment debtors remaining liable thereon
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other
ounties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall
ave been entered on the judgment docket of the
>unty where such judgment was first docketed, a
srtified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by
le clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with
le clerk of the district court in any other county
here the judgment may have been docketed Therepon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be
lade by the clerk of such court, and such entry shall
ave the same effect as in the county where the same
as originally entered
ule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
new tnal may be granted to all or any of the parties
id on all or part of the issues, for any of the followtg causes, provided, however, that on a motion for a
ew trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
iay open the judgment if one has been entered, take
iditional testimony, amend findings of fact and conusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
id direct the entry of a new judgment
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial
(2) Misconduct of the jury, and whenever any
one or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law
(7) Error in law
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial
lall be served not later than 10 days after the entry
the judgment
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the apphcaMI for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1),
), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit
Tienever a motion for a new tnal is based upon affiivits they shall be served with the motion The op>smg party has 10 days after such service within
hich to serve opposing affidavits The time within
hich the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be
rved may be extended for an additional period not
needing 20 days either by the court for good cause
lown or by the parties by written stipulation The
urt may permit reply affidavits
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days
ter entry of judgment the court of its own initiative
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may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new tnal on motion of a party,
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clencal mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein ansmg from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, surpnse, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new tnal under
Rule 59(b), (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extnnsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party, (4) when, for
any cause, the summons m an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action, (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application, or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action
Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new tnal or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial nghts of the parties
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment Execution or
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for
the secunty of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs
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(1) When a public officer is a party to an appeal or other proceeding in the court in an official
capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or
otherwise ceases to hold office, the action does
not abate and the officer's successor is automatically substituted as a party. Proceedings following the substitution shall be in the name of the
substituted party, but any misnomer not affecting the substantial rights of the parties shall be
disregarded. An order of substitution may be entered at any time, but the omission to enter such
an order shall not affect the substitution.
(2) When a public officer is a party to an appeal or other proceeding in an official capacity,
that party may be described as a party by official
title rather than by name, but the court may require the officer's name to be added.
Rule 39. Duties of the clerk.
(a) General provisions. The office of the clerk,
with the clerk or a deputy in attendance, shall be
open during business hours on all days except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
(b) The docket; calendar; other records required. The clerk shall keep a record, known as the
docket, in form and style as may be prescribed by the
court and shall enter therein each case. The number
of each case shall be noted on the page of the docket
whereon the first entry is made. All papers filed with
the clerk and all process, orders, and opinions shall be
entered chronologically in the docket on the pages
assigned to the case. Entries shall be brief but shall
show the nature of each paper filed or decision or
order entered and the date thereof. The clerk shall
keep a suitable index of cases contained in the docket.
The clerk shall keep a minute book in which shall
be entered a record of the daily proceedings of the
court. The clerk shall prepare, under the direction of
the presiding judge, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In placing cases on the calendar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to appeals in
criminal cases and to appeals and other proceedings
entitled to preference by law.
(c) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry
of an order or a decision, the clerk shall serve a notice
of entry by mail upon each party to the proceeding,
together with a copy of any opinion respecting the
order or decision, and shall make a note in the docket
of the mailing. Service on a party represented by
counsel shall be made upon counsel.
(d) Custody of records and papers. The clerk
shall have custody of the records and papers of the
court. The clerk shall not permit any original record
or paper to be taken from the clerk's custody, except
as authorized by these rules or the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as the
record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of
the case be returned to the court or agency from
which they were received. The clerk shall preserve
copies of briefs and attachments, as well as other
printed papers filed.
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanc*—
tions and discipline.
)(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper of a party represented by
£tt attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of
Record who is an active member in good standing of
foe bar of the Supreme Court of Utah. The attorney
shall sign his or her individual name and give his or
her business address. A party who is not represented
by an attorney shall sign every motion, brief, and
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other paper and state the party's address. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an
attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that the
attorney or the party has read the motion, brief, or
other paper; that to the best of the attorney's or the
party's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law; and that it is not interposed for any improper
purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a
motion, brief, or other paper is not signed as required
by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed
promptly after the omission is called to the attention
of the attorney or the party. If a motion, brief, or
other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or sua sponte, shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both
an appropriate sanction, which may include dismissal
or affirmance of the appeal, sanctions and discipline
under Paragraph (b) of this rule, or an order to pay to
the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
motion, brief, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney fee.
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and
parties. The court may, after reasonable notice and
an opportunity to show cause to the contrary and
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action
against any attorney or person who practices before it
for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or a
person allowed to appear before the court or for failure to comply with these rules of the court or order of
the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a member
of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Ethics
and Discipline Committee of the state bar for proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Discipline of
the State Bar.
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This
rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the
court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to practice before the bar of a
sister state or a foreign country but who is not a
member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Utah may
appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such attorney
shall be associated with an active member in good
standing of the bar of this court and shall be subject
to the provisions of this rule and all other provisions
of these rules.
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SECTION I. COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS.
RULE

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Definitions.
Reception of referral/preliminary inquiry.
Intake procedure.
Informal (non-judicial) adjustment procedure.
Contents of petition.
Responsive pleadings or motions.
SECTION II. CERTIFICATION TO DISTRICT
COURT.

7. Certification to district court for criminal proceedings.
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PROCESS

§16

While no general rule can be formulated upon this question as to writs
emanating from courts of record, the same is not true as to justices' courts,
since their jurisdiction is purely a creature of statute, and limited thereby, so
that failure of a summons issued by a justice of the peace to comply strictly
with statutory requirements as to appearance or return day generally prevents
the justice from acquiring jurisdiction, and renders void all subsequent proceedings in the action.5
§16. Designation and names of parties.
Parties to an action should be designated and described by their proper
names; in particular, the defendant must be sued in his true name, if known
or ascertainable by the plaintiff, or in the name which he has assumed or by
which he is generally known,8 and the summons directed to the defendant,
notifying him of the action, should properly contain the names of the parties
thereto. Under many practice provisions, in addition to the names of the
parties the summons must state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, otherwise the plaintiff's address.7
The process must show the party for whose benefit the action or proceeding
has been instituted 8 and the party who is to be served,9 and it should in all
cases state the correct Christian name and surname of both.10 The correct
naming of the defendants is generally a mandatory requirement. 11 A summons which names only one of several, followed by the words "et al.," is not
sufficient.12 Where, however, the names of the defendants are stated in the
title of the case in the summons, it is not necessary to repeat them. 13
Where the true name of a defendant is unknown when suit is instituted, it
is not improper to bring suit against him in the name of John Doe, and, when
that the omission from the statutory form of
summons which the statute requires to be
substantially complied with of the words
"exclusive of the day of service," when designat.ng the tunc for answer, does not render
the summons void where the statute itself expressly excludes the first day in the computation of time).
Annotation:
6 ALR 841, 849 et seq., s.
97 ALR 746, 751.

For states adopting rules similar to the
federal rules, see AM JUR 2d DESK BOOK,
Document 128.
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^ 8. McFadden v Mid-States Mfg. Corp. 175
Kan 240, 262 P2d 838; Hammond v Lewiston,
A. & W. Street R. Co. 106 Me 209, 76 A 672.

5. Rice v American Nat. Bank, 3 Colo App
81, 31 P 1024 (summons returnable upon a
day antedating its issuance held to confer no
jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace);
Davis v D. M. Osborn & Co. 156 Ind 86,
59 NE 279 (justice's court held to acquire no
jurisdiction where summons was made returnable in less than the time fixed by statute);
Pantall v Dickey, 123 Pa 431, 16 A 789
(ruling that a justice acquired no jurisdiction
by a summons returnable in a greater number
of days after its date than specified by statute);
Leonosio v Bartilino, 7 SD 93, 63 NW 543
(no jurisdiction acquired by a justice under
a summons returnable on a general election
day).
Annotation:
6 ALR 841, 851 et seq., s. 97
ALR 746, 752 et seq.
a c «;o A T OA D
fin;

,9' E x f f c t ? e a ! i ? r a ' r 6 ^ i ^ f c ^ t n "
Jen ^Mi^-States Mfg. Corp. 175 Kan 240,

6. See 59 Am Jur 2d, PARTIES § 15.

7. See Rule 4(b), Fed Rules oi Civ Proc.

10. Walker Fertilizer Co. v Race, 123 Fla
84, 166 So 283, 105 ALR 341.
As to effect of misnomer, see § 18, infra.
'
=
11. Lyman v Milton, 44 Cal 630; McFadden
v
^id-States Mfg. Corp. 175 Kan 240, 262
P2d 8S»; WasKington County v Gaines, 221
™*~* *Mt ^" SE2d 377.
However, the fact that a bill is filed against
a person in a representative capacity, although
process is against him as an individual, is
not a fatal defect, but may be ignored as
immaterial. Lambert v Huff, A. & T. Co. 82
W V a 362
> 9 5 *E 1031, 1 ALR 650.
12. Lyman v Milton, 44 Cal 630; Neff v
Tribune Printing Co. 421 Pa 122, 218 A2d
755

13. Martin v Parker, 14 Minn 13, Gil 1.
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service is made, to have the sheriff add the true name after an alias. In such
cases it is not necessary to prove that John Doe is the same person as the
defendant actually served if the latter by making no appearance or defense
admits by such inaction that he was the person intended to be sued.14 Generally, of course, unknown persons must be served by publication. 15
A warrant is sufficient to hold stockholders in a foreign corporation not
authorized to do business in the state liable as partners which describes them as
stockholders in a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in the
state, and summons them to answer an action on account for labor rendered.18
§17. —Similarity of names; evidence to show identity.
Sometimes there are two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the court
and the reach of its process bearing the same name, and the one served therewith is not the one intended to be sued. It has been stated that if a person
bearing the same name as the defendant is served with process and judgment
is entered against him, he cannot avoid its effect by proving that he was not
the person intended to be sued or served;17 but the better rule appears to be
that parol evidence is admissible to show the identity or nonidentity of parties.18
An identity of names may constitute prima facie proof of identity of person,19
but where the person against whom a judgment is sought to be enforced and
the true defendant bear different names, they are presumed to be different
persons, although this presumption may be rebutted by proof that the former
is the person who was served with process in the action.20
§ 18. — Misnomer; effect of incorrect name where party has been served.
While the summons or other process should state correctly the name of
the parties to the action and particularly the name of the person to be served,
a mistake in the defendant's name—a misnomer—is not necessarily a fatal
defect,1 but generally is considered to be a defect which may be amended,2
and it may even be disregarded where it is fairly certain that no prejudice has
resulted to the defendant. 3
As a general rule, an objection that the defendant was sued by the wrong
name is matter of abatement only, and will not avoid a judgment against him
14. Safeway Stores, Inc. v Ramirez, 99 Ariz
372, 409 P2d 292 (recognizing rule, but
pointing out that the true name was not inserted after an alias in the instant case, and
saying that it is not enough merely to serve
a person with process unless it is made known
to him that he is a defendant and is being
served in the place of one of the fictitious
persons); Curtis v Herrick, 14 Cal 117.
15. § 84, infra.
16. Cunnyngham v Shelby, 136 Tenn 176,
188 SW 1147.
17. Brum v Ivins, 154 Cal 17, 96 P 876.
18. Thornily v Prentice, 121 Iowa 89, 96
NW 728; Keene v Wilkerson, 45 Tenn App
455, 325 SW2d 286.
19. Ritchie v Carpenter, 2 Wash 512, 28 P
380.
20. Brum v Ivins, 154 Cal 17, 96 P 876.
800

1. Guzman v Montgomery Ward & Co. 9
Ariz App 186, 450 P2d 427; Modist v
Lynch, 277 Mass 135, 177 NE 861; Clevenger
v Grover, 212 NC 13, 193 SE 12, 124 ALR
82; O. K. Butler Const. Co. v Bentley, 205
Okla 225, 237 P2d 886; Fuel City Mfg. Co.
v Waynesburg Products Corp. 268 Pa 441,
112 A 145.
Annotation:
124 ALR 86 et seq.
As to misnomer or misdescription of parties
generally, see 59 Am Jur 2d, PARTIES §§ 257,

258.
2. See § 24, infra.
3 . A trial court is warranted in overruling
objections to purely formal changes in the
designation or names of parties where it is
clear that no prejudice can result to the defendant. Walker Fertilizer Co. v Race, 123
Fla 84, 166 So 283, 105 ALR 341.
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appear that such agent was authorized to bind his principal by the acceptance
of process.1 Authority of an agent to bind his principal by acceptance of
service of process may be implied by law from the ostensible relationship between the parties, 2 although an attorney does not, merely by virtue of a general
employment, have authority to accept service of process in behalf of his client
and bind him thereby.3
§ 30. Effect of defective service or loss of process.
Generally, service of process must be substantially in accordance with the
requirements of the law; if service is insufficient and unauthorized by law,
the court does not acquire jurisdiction and the judgment rendered is without
validity, force, or effect.4 This is true where notice is served on the wrong
person, although of the same name as the defendant,6 even if the party served,
on discovering the mistake, mails to the defendant the copy of the summons
served upon him, with a letter explaining the matter. 6 On the other hand,
actual service may be made even where the service is defective.7
The subsequent loss or destruction of a valid writ or summons after its
service upon the defendant—after it has fulfilled its function of giving the
defendant notice of the proceeding against him and an opportunity to appear
and defend—does not affect the plaintiff's action or defeat rights which have
been declared under such process or summons, provided its existence and the
acts done under it can be substantiated. 8 It has been said to be a matter resting
in the discretion of the court, upon ascertaining the defective state of the
record, to supply the deficiency.9 Oral proof may be received at a subsequent
term showing the loss and the nature of the sheriff's return, for the purpose
of upholding a judgment. 10 In many jurisdictions the statutes and rules of
practice contain express provisions governing the procedure to be followed
when process or a return has been lost or detroyed, usually providing for the
substitution of a copy or a substantial copy thereof, and in proper cases an
alias writ may doubtless be issued.11
1. Lower v Wilson, 9 SD 252, 68 NW 545.
As to service of process upon an agent
or attorney of a party, §§ 46, 47, infra.
2. Bass v American Products Export & Import Corp. 124 SC 346, 117 SE 594, 30 ALR
168.
Annotation:
30 ALR 176.
Authority on the part of a clerk of an
attorney to accept service of summons in an
action in which the attorney is a party defendant is not to be implied merely from the
fact that such clerk had authority to accept
service of papers in cases wherein the attorney had been employed professionally.
Lower v Wilson, 9 SD 252, 68 NW 545.
3. See

7 Am

Jur

2d,

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

i 117.
4. Nelson v Chittenden, 53 Colo 30, 123
P 656; Parkhurst v White, 254 Iowa 477, 118
NW2d 47; Laney v Garbee, 105 Mo 355, 16
SW 831; Sanford v Edwards, 19 Mont 56, 47
P 212; Durham Fertilizer Co. v Marshburn,
122NC411,29SE411.
See Restatement, JUDGMENTS § 8, Comment

5. Flowers v King, 145 NC 234, 58 SE 1074.
6. Schneitman v Noble, 75 Iowa 120, 39
NW 224; Savings Bank v Authier, 52 Minn
98, 53 NW 812.
7. National Metal Co. v Greene Consol.
Copper Co. 11 Ariz 108, 89 P 535; Quarl
v Abbett, 102 Ind 233, 1 NE 476.
8.' Mussina v Cavazos, 6 Wall (US) 355, 18
L Ed 810; York & C. R. Co. v Myers, 18
How (US) 246, 15 L Ed 380; Klosenski v
Flaherty (Fla) 116 So 2d 767, 82 ALR2d 664,
conformed to (Fla App) 117 So 2d 7.
Generally as to lost or destroyed judicial
records and the restoration thereof, see 52 Am
Jur

2d, LOST AND DESTROYED INSTRUMENTS

§§ 31 et seq.
9. York & C. R. Co. v Myers, 18 How (US)
246, 15 L Ed 380.
10. Gentry v Hutchcraft, 7 TB Mon (Ky)
241.
11. Practice

Aids.—Alias

summons.
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